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Abstract
During the last few decades, a tremendous progress in the performance of
semiconductor devices has been accomplished. In this emerging era of high
performance applications, machines need not only to be efficient but also
need to be dependable at circuit and system levels. Several works have
been proposed to increase embedded systems efficiency by reducing the gap
between software flexibility and hardware high-performance. Due to their re-
configurable aspect, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) represented
a relevant step towards bridging this performance/flexibility gap. Neverthe-
less, Dynamic Reconfiguration (DR) has been continuously suffering from a
bottleneck corresponding to a long reconfiguration time.
In this thesis, we propose a novel medium-grained high-speed dynamic
reconfiguration technique for DSP48E1-based circuits. The idea is to take
advantage of the DSP48E1 slices runtime reprogrammability coupled with a
re-routable interconnection block to change the overall circuit functionality
in one clock cycle. In addition to the embedded systems efficiency, this thesis
deals with the reliability chanllenges in new sub-micron electronic systems.
In fact, as new technologies rely on reduced transistor size and lower supply
voltages to improve performance, electronic circuits are becoming remarkably
sensitive and increasingly susceptible to transient errors. The system-level
impact of these errors can be far-reaching and Single Event Transients (SETs)
have become a serious threat to embedded systems reliability, especially for
especially for safety critical applications such as transportation systems. The
reliability enhancement techniques that are based on overestimated soft error
rates (SERs) can lead to unnecessary resource overheads as well as high
power consumption. Considering error masking phenomena is a fundamental
element for an accurate estimation of SERs.
This thesis proposes a new cross-layer model of circuits vulnerability
based on a combined modeling of Transistor Level (TLM) and System Level
Masking (SLM) mechanisms. We then use this model to build a self adaptive
fault tolerant architecture that evaluates the circuit’s effective vulnerability
at runtime. Accordingly, the reliability enhancement strategy is adapted to
protect only vulnerable parts of the system leading to a reliable circuit with
optimized overheads. Experimentations performed on a radar-based obstacle
detection system for railway transportation show that the proposed approach
allows relevant reliability/resource utilization tradeoffs.
Keywords: Embedded Systems - Reliability - Dependability - Dynami-
cally Reconfigurable Architectures - Soft Errors
Re´sume´
Un e´norme progre`s dans les performance des semiconducteurs a e´te´ accompli
ces dernie`res anne`es. Avec l’e´mergence d’applications complexes, les sys-
te`mes embarque´s doivent eˆtre a` la fois performants et fiables. Une multitude
de travaux ont e´te´ propose´s pour ame´liorer l’efficacite´ des syste`mes embar-
que´s en re´duisant le de´calage entre la flexibilite´ des solutions logicielles et
la haute performance des solutions mate´rielles. En vertu de leur nature re-
configurable, les FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays) repre´sentent un
pas conside´rable pour re´duire ce de´calage performance/flexibilite´. Cepen-
dant, la reconfiguration dynamique a toujours souffert d’une limitation lie´e
a` la latence de reconfiguration.
Dans cette the`se, une nouvelle technique de reconfiguration dynamique
au niveau ”grain-moyen” pour les circuits a` base de blocks DSP48E1 est pro-
pose´e. L’ide´e est de profiter de la reprogrammabilite´ des blocks DSP48E1
couple´e avec un circuit d’interconnection reconfigurable afin de changer la
fonction imple´mente´e par le circuit en un cycle horloge. D’autre part, comme
les nouvelles technologies s’appuient sur la re´duction des dimensions des tran-
sistors ainsi que les tensions d’alimentation, les circuits e´lectroniques sont
devenus de plus en plus susceptibles aux fautes transitoires. L’impact de
ces erreurs au niveau syste`me peut eˆtre catastrophique et les SETs (Single
Event Transients) sont devenus une menace tangible a` la fiabilite´ des sys-
te`mes embarque´s, en l’occurrence pour les applications critiques comme les
syste`mes de transport. Les techniques de fiabilite´ qui se basent sur des taux
d’erreurs (SERs) surestime´s peuvent conduire a` un gaspillage de ressources
et par conse´quent un cout en consommation de puissance e´lectrique. Il est
primordial de prendre en compte le phe´nome`ne de masquage d’erreur pour
une estimation pre´cise des SERs.
Cette the`se propose une nouvelle mode´lisation inter-couches de la
vulne´rabilite´ des circuits qui combine les me´canismes de masquage au niveau
transistor (TLM) et le masquage au niveau Syste`me (SLM). Ce mode`le est
ensuite utilise´ afin de construire une architecture adaptative tole´rante aux
fautes qui e´value la vulne´rabilite´ effective du circuit en runtime. La strate´gie
d’ame´lioration de fiabilite´ est adapte´e pour ne prote´ger que les parties vul-
nerables du syste`me, ce qui engendre un circuit fiable avec un cout optimise´.
Les experimentations effectue´es sur un syste`me de de´tection d’obstacles a`
base de radar pour le transport ferroviaire montre que l’approche propose´e
permet d’e´tablir un compromis fiabilite´/ressources utilise´es.
Mots cle´s : Syste`mes Embarque´s- Fiabilite´ - Architectures Reconfig-
urables Dynamiquement- Erreurs Transitoires
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General Context
This thesis is funded by the IRT (Technological Research Institute) Raile-
nium [3]. IRT is a foundation for scientific cooperation whose role is to
perform a research, development and innovation strategy that targets rail-
way infrastructure and systems, setting up R&D projects and carrying out
research activities, applications and training sessions.
WP5 
Sensors & Diagnos-c 
WP4 
Telecommunica-on 
& Intelligent Systems  
WP3 
Energy Management 
WP6 
Op-misa-on & Asset 
Management 
WP7 
Modeling & 
Virtual Prototyping 
R&D 
WP2 
Civil Engineering 
WP1 
Process and 
Materials 
WP8 
Economy & Sustainable 
development 
 
Figure 1.1: Research Program Working Packages
As shown in Figure 1.1, IRT research activities are composed of 8 Work-
ing Packages (WPs) and our work is a part of the WP4. Within WP4, this
1
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research is conducted in the framework of the SURCIFER project. This
latter’s goals are: to create tools and methods that enhance rail operation
and management and develop innovative control-command and signaling sys-
tems. The project thereby tries to enhance systems reliability and safety
while optimizing cost and utilized resources. The program takes into ac-
count telecommunication systems robustness, reliability, as well as to design
effective positioning systems.
1.2 Motivations
The huge amount of data and complexity of the tasks supported by embedded
systems imposed an inevitable focus on circuits flexibility to allow resources
reuse. For example, safety-oriented embedded systems in railway transporta-
tion domain handle data that is continuously forwarded from several het-
erogeneous sensors. These applications require various interconnected tasks
including signal processing, communication, obstacle detection and recogni-
tion ...etc. Moreover, embedded systems are increasingly utilized in emerging
fields such as Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) and the gap between
the technology trend and the practically implemented technology is getting
narrower. In fact the delay of about 5 years that used to be a sufficient
technological ”comfort zone” to integrate mature and stable technologies is
disappearing. As shown in Figure 1.2, by the year 2015, the gap between
CMOS technology trends and the utilized technology is vanishing because
of the new applications high requirements. Moreover, the integration of
new technologies to build these systems results in an increasing sensitiv-
ity to external-event-induced errors. In fact, the International Technology
Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) predicts that every new generation of
integrated circuits reduces the lifetime of the corresponding systems by half
[7].
This thesis focuses on the flexibility of FPGA-based circuits as well as
on the reliability challenge in embedded systems new generations. The mo-
tivations illustrated by Figure 1.3 are to design a very fast reconfiguration
process and to propose low overhead reliability enhancement techniques in
new computing systems.
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Figure 1.2: The trend of CMOS technologies use in the automotive domain
vs CMOS technologies evolution [16]
Figure 1.3: An overview on the thesis contributions
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1.2.1 Overcoming FPGAs Reconfiguration Latency
As shown in Figure 1.4, the different computing architectures vary, mainly,
depending on their specifications in terms of flexibility and performance. The
major benefit from ASICs is their high performance, while microprocessors
offer a comfortable flexibility to the programmers. Reconfigurable architec-
tures offer a trade-off between the two computing architectures.
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) is a commonly utilized recon-
figurable architecture in a wide range of application fields. This is mainly
due to their flexibility, low cost and relatively short time-to-market. FPGA-
based designs implement circuits with continuously increasing requirements
and complexity. Accordingly, FPGAs are solicited to host larger designs
while boards size growth is limited by the scale of the silicon process tech-
nology. Hence, to cope with high applications requirements and hardware
resources budget, engineering designs saw the appearance of the Dynamic
Reconfiguration (DR) approach. DR’s primary contribution is the flexibility
increase by reusing hardware resources.
Figure 1.4: Different computing architectures comparison in terms of
Flexibility and Performance
The reconfigurable aspect of FPGAs is, by consequence, a key feature
that allows building efficient and flexible embedded systems. Nevertheless,
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DR has been continuously suffering from the shortcoming of a long configu-
ration latency. This is mainly due to the technological constraints related to
the bitstream downloading technique in the conventional fine-grained FPGA
reconfiguration process. To overcome this shortness, a multitude of the pro-
posed Coarse-Grain Reconfigurable Architectures (CGRAs) and overlay ar-
chitectures were developed regardless the available FPGA boards different
resources. The main limitation of these designs is their complex design flow
and the lack of CAD tools that facilitate their utilization.
Along with FPGA generations, available resources progress and new hard-
ware elements appear. DSP slices are embedded hardware blocks found in
modern FPGAs. These primitives are getting increasing attention and are
available with higher numbers in the new boards as they provide area, per-
formance, and power advantages over the equivalent functions implemented
using the FPGA fabric. Moreover, DSP slices afford a widely exploitable
range of flexibility and can be easily reconfigured at run-time using dedi-
cated signals.Using DSP blocks as Processing Elements (PEs) in overlay ar-
chitectures leads to better performance with further reconfiguration facilities.
This thesis explores techniques towards bridging the performance-flexibility
gap through the exploitation of the DSPs’ intrinsic specifications.
1.2.2 Reliability challenge in new sub-micron systems
The progress in nanoscale technologies led to a tremendous development in
embedded systems performance. This progress was necessary to cope with
new generations of complex and highly requiring applications that go from
smart phones multidisciplinary tasks to high security demanding transporta-
tion and aerospace applications. Particularly, the railway environment is
extremely aggressive because of high electromagnetic fields and low power
electronic systems operate close to components with very high voltages and
currents from trains.
The applications high requirements in terms of performance imply an
inevitable increase in systems operating frequencies. This means an incre-
ment in dynamic power consumption and additional reliability-related issues
because of the timing-violation risks. The designed circuits need to meet
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reliability and safety standards such as EN 50126, EN 50128 and EN 50129
in railway-dedicated systems. However, as limiting power consumption is
primordial for embedded systems designers, new techniques relying on down-
scaling supply voltage emerged. Furthermore, as new CMOS technologies
rely on shrinking transistors size, circuits sensitivity issues became an critical
concern. In conclusion, shrunk-transistors-based circuits are operating under
aggressively scaled supply voltage. Hence, the susceptibility of these circuits
to errors considerably increased and some phenomena that are beforehand
considered as very rare became a serious threat to reliability not only for ag-
gressive environments related systems, but also for mainstream applications.
Consequently, the increasing sub-micron circuits sensitivity imposed reliabil-
ity as a priority in electronic systems design process. However, reliability
enhancement has a considerable cost: most of the existing error mitigation
techniques suffer from huge area and power overheads, or lead to consider-
able performance penalties. In fact, the reliability enhancement techniques
that are based on overestimated Soft Error Rates (SERs) lead to unnecessary
resource overheads as well as high power consumption. Nevertheless, within
the same application, some data are more critical than others. Accordingly,
within the same system, as some errors may be masked, some parts are more
vulnerable to errors than others. Hence, considering error masking phenom-
ena is a fundamental element for an accurate estimation of SERs. In this
thesis, we propose a new cross-layer model of circuits vulnerability based on
a combined modeling of Transistor Level (TLM) and System Level Mask-
ing (SLM) mechanisms. We then use this model to build a self adaptive
fault tolerant architecture that evaluates the circuit’s effective vulnerability
at run-time. Accordingly, the reliability enhancement strategy is adapted to
protect only vulnerable parts of the system leading to a reliable circuit with
optimized overheads.
1.3 Contributions and thesis outline
The main contributions of this thesis can be formulated as follows:
• The proposition of a high speed Dynamic Reconfiguration (DR) tech-
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nique for DSP-based circuits that overcomes the limitations of the con-
ventional FPGAs DR process: we take advantage from DSP slices flex-
ibility to build circuits having the ability to change the implemented
functionality in only one clock cycle, and this, regardless the circuit
size and complexity. In order to facilitate the design flow of DR of
DSP-based circuits, a tool is proposed. The tool accelerates the de-
sign process by generating configuration vectors corresponding to the
desired functionality.
• A cross-layer modeling of input-dependent masking mechanisms within
computing elements: it combines transistor level error masking in com-
binational circuits and system level masking intrinsic to applications.
The model estimates the system vulnerability depending on the signals
applied to the inputs. Hence, circuits intrinsic masking phenomena im-
pact on SERs can be estimated at design-time depending on the applied
input combination.
• A self tuning fault tolerance technique that adapts the reliability strat-
egy to the actual circuit vulnerability obtained from the masking model:
depending on the previously cited model, and using the dynamic re-
configuration technique referred to in the first contribution, the system
chooses at run-time the redundancy map depending on the vulnera-
bility estimation. As the reliability requirements vary depending on
the application field as well as the system operating environment, the
proposed technique allows designers to tune the reliability enhance-
ment strategy depending on the actual application, field and operating
environment requirements. Hence, it offers more accurately relaxed
reliability thereby saving resources as well as power.
• A circuit level modified SRAM architecture that hardens the memories
against soft errors: with a single inverter put in parallel with the 6T-
SRAM memory cell, AS8-SRAM increases the critical charge of the cell
thereby reducing the probability of soft errors. The advantage of AS8-
SRAM is its low overhead with comparable hardening results to state
of the art techniques.
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• An architecture level method for register files reliability enhancement
in microprocessors: depending on the registers length, we use adja-
cent registers narrow-width to enhance registers immunity to transient
errors. Using this opportunistic fault tolerance technique, the over-
all processor reliability is enhanced with low additional circuitry and
without any additional memory.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2
presents the proposed dynamic reconfiguration technique (ARENA) with two
illustration cases: an arithmetic and logic coprocessor that can support a
very wide range of operations and a reconfigurable unit that implements a
number of signal processing kernels. Chapter 3 builds a cross-layer model for
estimating the vulnerability of combinational logic, and presents a self tuned
systems for adaptive reliability enhancement. Chapter 4 focuses on SRAM
memories immunity to soft errors and presents AS8-SRAM architecture. An
architecture level technique to enhance register files reliability is detailed in
Chapter 5. The thesis is finally concluded in Chapter 6 and some interesting
future ideas to work on in the future are proposed.
Chapter 2
Accelerating Dynamic
Reconfiguration in DSP-based
Circuits
This chapter proposes a high-speed reconfiguration method for DSP-based
circuits.
2.1 Introduction
During the last years, several works have been proposed to reduce the gap
between software flexibility and hardware high-performance within embed-
ded systems. Due to their reconfigurable nature, Field Programmable Gate
Arrays (FPGAs) represented a relevant step towards bridging this perfor-
mance/flexibility gap. Nevertheless, Dynamic Reconfiguration (DR) has been
continuously suffering from a bottleneck corresponding to a long reconfigu-
ration time. This is mainly due to the technological constraints related to
bitstream downloading within the FPGAs conventional reconfiguration pro-
cess. In this paper, we propose a novel medium-grained high-speed dynamic
reconfiguration technique for DSP48E1-based circuits. The idea is to take
advantage of the DSP48E1 slices run-time reprogrammability coupled with a
re-routable interconnection block to change the overall circuit functionality
in one clock cycle. We validate the proposed approach on two commonly
used circuits in embedded systems: a fully pipelined arithmetic and logic co-
processor and a Signal Processing (SP) reconfigurable unit. The first design
utilizes the same resources to implement a set of single precision, double pre-
cision, integer and logic operations while the second fits several widely used
9
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DSP-dedicated kernels within the same device.
Mobile computing is increasingly demanding powerful application pro-
cessors that can deliver high levels of performance and energy efficiency in
a wide range of application domains. These processors are used to run a
mix of applications having varying degrees of computational needs. To pro-
vide the necessary level of performance, application processors are increas-
ingly designed around heterogeneous multi-core architectures. To match the
widest range of applications, they use dedicated processing units for differ-
ent functionalities. For example, each of the four ARMv7 processor cores
of the Krait 300 CPU include hardware support for SIMD, vector floating-
point, security, and Java byte code instructions [2]. Such high integration
levels increase performance and energy efficiency when applications are well
matched to available cores and hardware. However, it can also complicate de-
signs and waste resources when hardware units are under-utilized. Moreover,
even when low-power design techniques are used, static power dissipated from
poorly utilized resources can reduce energy efficiency. We believe heterogene-
ity in application processors can be more efficiently supported using recon-
figurable hardware architectures that leverage programmable interconnection
networks and simple arithmetic and logic units to dynamically organize into
specific computational structures.
Practically, two well known traditional computing systems are commonly
used to execute beforehand implemented tasks. The first way is to rely on
dedicated circuits known as Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)
to support the desired functionality in hardware. The second is to run a set
of instructions on a processor. As ASICs are designed to a specific task, they
are highly efficient. However, once manufactured, the circuit is unchangeable
and cannot be reconfigured. Microprocessors, on the other hand, are very
flexible and the system functionality is altered just by changing the instruc-
tions at software level with absolutely no change on the target hardware.
Nevertheless, this flexibility is based on a complex execution process which
results in a considerable performance degradation. Hence, designers face a
dilemma in choosing the target platform between flexibility and performance
at the expense of each other.
During the last years, many research works proposed techniques and ar-
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Figure 2.1: Conventional FPGA fabric architecture [26]
chitectures intending to achieve higher performance than microprocessors
without drastic loss in terms of flexibility. In this context, reconfigurable
computing seemed to be a good trade-off that is practically realized through
FPGAs. The reconfigurable aspect of FPGAs is a relevant step towards
bridging this performance/flexibility gap within embedded systems. The
conventional FPGA fabric architecture is shown in Figure 2.1. Based on
Configurable Logic Blocs (CLBs) and routable interconnections, FPGAs of-
fer potentially higher performance than soft cores with interesting improve-
ment in hardware flexibility. Besides, via Dynamic Reconfiguration (DR),
designers are able to map more functions to the same logic resources which
helps to increase systems productivity and scalability.
Unfortunately, conventional FPGA architectures suffer from high cost of
power consumption and limitation of speed due to the routing area overhead
and timing penalty of their bit-level bitstream-based reconfiguration process.
To overcome the shortness caused by mainstream FPGAs’ fine granularity
reconfiguration, a multitude of the proposed Coarse-Grain Reconfigurable
Architectures (CGRAs) and overlay architectures were developed with little
consideration for the available FPGA boards different resources.
The main limitation of these designs is their complex design flow and the
lack of CAD tools that facilitate their application. Embedded hard primi-
tives, such as DSP48E1 blocks in Xilinx FPGAs shown in Figure 2.3 provide
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performance, area and power advantages over the equivalent circuits imple-
mented within FPGA fabric resources. Using these slices as Processing Ele-
ments (PEs) in overlay architectures leads to better performance with further
reconfiguration facilities.
DSP blocks in modern FPGAs are getting increasing focus as they pro-
vide a vast range of arithmetic and logic functions, offering high performance
and saving Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs). As these blocks provide area-
efficient implementations for multiplication, addition, multiply-accumulate
and logical operations, they have been widely used in signal processing ap-
plications. Xilinx FPGAs contain flexible DSP48E1 primitives whose behav-
ior can be dynamically programmable. The specific function of these DSP
slices can be modified at runtime through special control signals [1]. Figure
2.3 shows the DSP48E1 architecture: Ports A, B, C and D, supply input
operands to the multiplier and add/sub/logic block. The specific function
carried by a DSP48E1 is controlled by dedicated control signals that enable
the DSP to run in different modes. For example, the implemented opera-
tion can be configured by ALUMODE, the ALU input selection is specified
through OPMODE, and INMODEmonitors the pre-adder and input pipeline.
Figure 2.2 presents the minimum and maximum number of DSP48 blocks
within every Xilinx Virtex family (from Virtex 4 to Virtex 7). The increasing
availability of DSP48 slices in Xilinx FPGA families reflects an expanding
demand on its utilization by designers.
The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
• A generic DSP-based reconfiguration approach that achieves high speed
reconfiguration based on intrinsic DSP48E1 flexibility enhanced with a
reconfigurable interconnection block.
• A mapping tool that takes a high level description of the different com-
putational kernels and generates the reconfigurable circuit with the
different configuration vectors. This tool bypasses the conventional
FPGA compilation flow and maps to the overlay.
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2.2 Related works
Over the past 20 years, a large number of reconfigurable architectures has
been proposed. These varied in their degree of coupling to a host processor,
granularity, and dynamic reconfigurability. Some architectures like [88], [90],
[56], [85] use fine-grained reconfigurable logic to extend the ISA of a host pro-
cessor [88], [90] or accelerate performance-critical loop nests and functions
[56], [85]. However, the high reconfiguration overheads of the FPGA-like
logic fabrics require costly and power-hungry solutions to reduce configura-
tion context switching times. Other architectures like RAPID [42], ADRES
[74] and Morphosys [68] use coarse-grained reconfigurable logic to accelerate
repetitive or streaming computational tasks. As shown in Figure 2.4, CGRAs
consist of an array of functional units (FUs) interconnected by a mesh net-
work. Due to their quick reconfigurability and parallelism, these architectures
are remarkably well suited for applications with intensive computation work-
load such as multimedia applications. CGRAs can be reconfigurable either
statically such as GARP [57] and RAW [87] or dynamically such as Mor-
phosys [68] and Piperench [51]. Storing temporary data is performed using
distributed register files within the CGRAs FUs and the arithmetic opera-
tions are executed by the FUs. In contrast to FPGAs, CGRAs have short
reconfiguration times, low delay characteristics, and low power consumption
as they are constructed from standard cell implementations. Thus, gate-level
reconfigurability is sacrificed, but the result is a large increase in hardware
efficiency. CGRAs try to avoid the shortcomings of fine-grained FPGA com-
puting architectures by building wide datapaths through complex processing
elements instead of bit-level configuration. Hence, CGRAs achieve efficient
implementation of complex operators in silicon. The interconnection between
the different processing elements of CGRAs can be either mesh, crossbar or
linear array. Although these architectures provide fast reconfiguration times,
their loose coupling to the host processor makes them more suitable for au-
tonomous compute tasks.
Our architecture differs from earlier works in combining coarse-grained re-
configurable logic elements with a datapath-oriented interconnection network
to offer high speed reconfigurability. The work of [84] is perhaps the closest
CHAPTER 2. ACCELERATING RECONFIGURATION OF DSP-BASED CIRCUITS 15
Figure 2.4: Typical coarse-grained reconfigurable computing platform [30]
in scope to our own. However, our interconnection network is better suited
for implementing specific, datapath-oriented, computational structures [38].
This approach was recently used in [28] to enable resource sharing for dif-
ferent arithmetic operations. Finally, recent works have explored the use of
overlay architectures (e.g. [25]) and embedded hardware blocks (e.g. [34])
to implement data processing systems efficiently in FPGA fabrics. Overlay
architectures are configurable systems implemented on top of a conventional
FPGA. They are mainly efficient in offering flexibility and portability as they
are board-independent. Although we also use a form of overlay architecture
and embedded DSP blocks, our approach is not aimed at FPGA fabrics only;
it can also be implemented as an ASIC IP block.
2.3 Proposed approach
The main idea behind ARENA: A High-speed Dynamic REconfiguration Ap-
proach for DSP-based Circuits is to suggest a method for high speed dynamic
reconfiguration of DSP-oriented embedded systems. From an architectural
view, a DSP-based circuit is composed of a number of DSP slices carrying on
elementary operations. Routing these different blocks allows to implement
an overall function expressing the correlation between the output and the
input signals. Consequently, reprogramming a DSP-based circuit consists of
two essential operations: changing the DSP blocks implemented elementary
functions on the one hand, and accordingly routing the internal signals on the
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other hand. The proposed technique takes advantage from a crucial feature
of embedded DSP blocks within new FPGA boards which is run-time pro-
grammability and flexible support of several arithmetic and logic operations.
As detailed in Section 2.1 of this Chapter, to identify the implemented func-
tion of a DSP48 block, the dedicated input signals [INMODE, ALUMODE
and OPMODE] need to be specified. Moreover, routing the different blocks
consists of the definition of the corresponding select signal inputs of the differ-
ent multiplexers. Hence, given a number of DSP-based circuits implementing
different functions, we propose an algorithm that generates an architecture
that merges the different kernels in one dynamically reconfigurable unit. The
circuit changes its functionality at runtime through a reconfiguration process
that needs only one clock cycle to be performed. In fact, a configuration vec-
tor that is generated by the proposed algorithm at design time is composed
of different bit fields that serve as [INMODE, ALUMODE and OPMODE]
inputs of the different DSP48E1 slices deciding the implemented elementary
operation. Besides, other bit fields of the automatically generated configura-
tion vector control the interconnection block in order to route the different
internal signals as well as the input/output wires according to the chosen
circuit.
A DSP-based reconfigurable circuit (RC) consists of a number of inter-
connected DSP blocks performing a set of time-multiplexed functionalities.
The DSP slices are modeled through a state vector corresponding to their
actual input signals and implemented operation: [I, F ]. The interconnection
block is dedicated to route the different signals to the correct connections
according to the circuit configuration. As the interconnection block is built
through multiplexers, the routing process consists of controlling the MUXs
through their inputs/select signals: [i, sel]. Hence, a RC configuration is de-
fined by identifying the different state vectors. This is practically realized
using a configuration vector v that includes MUXs’ select inputs and DSPs’
operation codes: v = [selmux1, ..., selmuxN , opcodedsp1, ..., opcodedspM ].
In Algorithm 1, we present the different steps of a RC generation process
corresponding to a set of initial circuits SC. We define a dsp CIRCUIT as a
data structure with the following attributes:
• a number of interconnected DSP blocks.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Dynamically Reconfigurable Circuit (DRC) gen-
eration
Procedure Merge()
Inputs: Set of initial circuits (SC)
Outputs: DR circuit and configuration vectors
// The number of DSP slices within the SC
Integer max ← NbMaxDSP(SC);
//The number of inputs within the SC
Integer in ← NbMaxInput(SC);
//The number of outputs within the SC
Integer out ← NbMaxOutput(SC);
dsp CIRCUIT DRC, C;
for DSP , i = 1..max do
for each input k of DSPi do
Set of inputs I = ∅ ;
for each C in SC do
if DSPi is used in C then
Add the input k of DSPi to I;
end
end
//Let m be the number of elements in I
m=Card(I) ;
if m > 1 then
Create a m-to-1 MUX with I as inputs;
Affect this MUX to DSPi k
th input;
Add the MUX to DRC;
end
end
Set of operations Ops = ∅ ;
for each C in SC do
if DSPi is used in C then
Add the operation of DSPi to Ops;
end
end
Affect Ops to DSPi realized operations;
Add DSPi to DRC;
end
Calculate configuration vectors vj for each SCj;
Return (DRC and v);
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Figure 2.5: ARENA circuits general architecture
• and the global input and output signals.
The number of DSP slices within the RC and the global input/output
signals correspond respectively to the maximum number of DSPs and the
inputs/outputs required by the different elementary circuits. To identify
the required MUXs within the RC, an exploration is performed within the
set of static circuits. Let be m the number of dissimilar signals applied to
a given DSP input. If m > 1, it means that this very input is solicited
by m different signals. Therefore, a m-to-1 MUX needs to be created in
order to allow routing the different applied signals to the corresponding DSP
input. Furthermore, a third exploration step is undertaken within the static
circuits to identify the set of operations that are performed by the different
DSPs. Finally, the algorithm calculates the different configuration vectors
that control the implemented DSP operations as well as the corresponding
interconnection mode.
For illustration, Figure 2.6 represents a trivial example of circuit merging
for RC generation. In this example, we have two initial circuits: the first
one performs two arithmetic functions in parallel { A × D ; B - C } while
the second one performs one arithmetic function { A × B + C }. The RC is
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composed of 2 DSP slices which is the number of DSPs in both initial circuits.
For DSP1, we notice that dissimilar signals within the two initial circuits are
applied to the second input: D in circuit 1 and B in circuit 2. Hence, a
2-to-1 MUX is created taking D and B as inputs. Besides, DSP2 realizes
both addition an subtraction operations in circuit 1 and 2 respectively. The
configuration vectors controls the programming inputs of the DSP slice to
match the configurations corresponding functionalities.
Using this technique, we can proposed DR architectures that further im-
proves DSP-oriented embedded systems performance while adding architec-
tural flexibility. In the next two next Sections, we present two practical
applications as an illustration of the proposed technique:
• ARABICA, for A Reconfigurable Arithmetic Block for ISA CustomizA-
tion: This IP consists of a dynamically reconfigurable arithmetic and
logic unit that implements different kernels using the same resources.
• A DSP-based Reconfigurable Unit for Signal Processing Applications:
This IP implements several commonly used signal processing kernels
using shared resources.
2.4 ARABICA: A Reconfigurable Arith-
metic Block for ISA CustomizAtion
Instruction-set customization is a prime application of reconfigurable ar-
chitectures, and it is a well-known technique for enhancing a processor’s
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performance and energy efficiency[37], [61]. However, existing instruction
set customization techniques are based on design-time architectural explo-
ration, which often leads to solutions with limited flexibility that require
dedicated hardware units. More flexible solutions can be obtained using
a dynamically reconfigurable, datapath-oriented architecture and intercon-
nection network capable of implementing common computational structures
(e.g. SIMD, VLIW, and data flow) using simple computational building
blocks. Before executing a custom instruction, the processor’s datapath can
be configured with an appropriate computational structure. Once the in-
struction has been executed and is no longer needed, the hardware can be
reconfigured into another structure to support another instruction. In this
Section we present ARABICA (A Reconfigurable Arithmetic Block for ISA
CustomizAtion), a dynamically reconfigurable computational block that is
designed using ARENA approach.
2.4.1 Architecture
ARABICA consists of a fully pipelined programmable network of multiplex-
ers and four, programmable, DSP48E1 slices. Reprogramming the multi-
plexers and DSP48E1 slices at run-time enables us to modify the structural
organization and functionality of the ARABICA block to support a small but
versatile set of instruction-set extensions.
The ARABICA block is configured by a single control word. The control
word is stored in an address register and used to index into a 78-bit-wide con-
figuration vector store that functions like the horizontal microcode stores of
early computer systems. The bit fields of a configuration vector determine the
structural organization of the ARABICA block by enabling the interconnec-
tion paths that organize slices into specific computational structures. They
also determine its functionality by specifying the operations that different
DSP48E1 slices perform. ARABICA currently supports four instruction-set
extensions: four-way SIMD exclusive-or (XOR4); signed integer multiply-
accumulate (MACC); a dataflow instruction that implements the integer
multiply-add (MADD) function: f = g.h+i; and two-way, single-precision,
floating-point addition (SPFADD2), which demonstrates ARABICA’s sup-
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Figure 2.7: IEEE 754 single precision format
port for both floating-point arithmetic and VLIW-style ILP. The floating
point operations are following the IEEE 754 single precision format shown
in Figure 2.7. The output signals: [R0...R3] hold the results forwarded from
the corresponding datapath. In MACC and MADD case, only R1 is uti-
lized while XOR4 forwards 4 results at once and thereby needs the whole
signals. In SPFADD2, R0 and R1 are used as the two parallel floating point
operations result.
The execution block consists of four DSP48E1 slices, three dedicated
hardware blocks, and a programmable interconnection network of multiplex-
ers overlayed on the FPGA fabric. The DSP48E1 slices are 48-bit embedded
ALUs capable of implementing a wide range of operations including mul-
tiplication, multiply-accumulate, addition, subtraction, and Boolean logic
functions. The functionality of a DSP48E1 slice can be modified at run time
by setting its control inputs. The dedicated hardware blocks implement a
set of operations currently not supported by the DSP48E1 slices, but that
are necessary for floating-point arithmetic. These include unsigned-to-signed
number conversion, select and shift logic, and result normalization. From
a functional perspective we assume each of these blocks is a DSP48E1 slice
configured to implement the corresponding operation.
The latency of a custom instruction depends on the structural organiza-
tion and delay paths along its computational blocks. To minimize the impact
of variable-latency instructions on ARABICA’s clock cycle time, we pipelined
the inputs of its DSP48E1 slices and dedicated hardware blocks, which ap-
pear as shaded rectangles in Figure 2.8. In order to minimize the routing
circuitry we used the registers embedded within the slice itself aspipeline se-
quential elements. Table 2.1 shows the latencies and initiation intervals of
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Figure 2.8: ARABICA internal architecture
TABLEAU 2.1: ARABICA instruction clock cycle latencies
Operation Description Latency (clk cycles)
XOR4 4 parallel 32 bits XOR 1
MACC signed integer multiply-accumulate 2
MADD 32-bit integer multiply-add 2
SPFADD2 single-precision, floating-point addition 4
ARABICA’s custom instructions. The initiation interval (II) is the minimum
number of clock cycles that must elapse before another instruction can be
executed.
2.4.2 Test Platform
Figure 2.9 shows the system architecture including ARABICA and the test-
ing platform. It consists of the ARABICA block connected to a Xilinx Mi-
croBlaze soft processor using a pair of Fast Simplex Links (FSL) [12]. The
ARABICA block extends the instruction set architecture of the MicroBlaze
processor with custom instructions exhibiting different forms of instruction-
level parallelism. These include SIMD, VLIW, custom data-flow, and single-
CHAPTER 2. ACCELERATING RECONFIGURATION OF DSP-BASED CIRCUITS 23
ARABICA
Programmable 
Interconnect
DSP48E1 
Computational 
Blocks
Output 
Buffer
Input 
Buffer
Address 
Register
Execution Block
Configuration Vector 
Store
Xilinx MicroBlaze 
Processor
FSL FSL
Custom Logic 
Blocks
Figure 2.9: The test platform including ARABICA, a MicroBlaze processor
and input/output buffers
precision, floating-point, instructions. These extensions are by no means
exhaustive and are only used to demonstrate the versatility of the ARA-
BICA architecture, which can be easily extended to support a wider set of
instruction extensions. The FSL channels connect the MicroBlaze processor
to the ARABICA block. While one channel transfers configuration com-
mands and data operands to the block, a second channel transfers results
back to the processor. This coupling is imposed by current Xilinx technol-
ogy, which supports extensions to the MicroBlaze micro-architecture through
FSL-connected co-processors only [11].
The number of operands used by different instruction-set extensions varies
depending on the nature of the corresponding computation. For example, a
XOR4 instruction uses eight, 32-bit operands, while a MACC instruction uses
only two. Since the FSL channel can only transfer one, 32-bit, data word at a
time, an input buffer is used to synchronize data operands. The input buffer
uses a bank of shift registers to delay different operands by different amounts
until all operands become available. The operands can then be applied to
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the inputs of the execution block simultaneously.
Once an instruction completes execution, its results are transferred back
to the MicroBlaze processor over the output FSL channel. Different ARA-
BICA instructions generate a different number of results with possibly dif-
ferent bit widths. For example, the XOR4 instruction generates four, 32-bit
results while the SPFADD2 instruction generates two, 32-bit results. An
output buffer is therefore needed.
2.4.3 Experimental Methodology
We developed three prototypes and compared them in terms of FPGA re-
source utilization, execution performance, and power and energy consump-
tion. Our first prototype is a standalone MicroBlaze system that implements
the functionalities of ARABICA’s instructions in software. The MicroBlaze
processor is configured to use a single-precision floating-point unit. Our sec-
ond prototype is an ARABICA block connected to a MicroBlaze processor.
Finally, our third prototype is a dedicated circuit block (DCB) consisting
of hardwired circuits for each of the custom instructions supported by the
ARABICA block. The circuits could only be used one at a time, and the
DCB is connected to a MicroBlaze processor using the same FSL interface as
the ARABICA block. This prototype represents the prevalent, ASIP-based,
approach to application processor design. We implemented the three proto-
types in the Virtex-6 XC6VLX240T FPGA found on the ML605 development
board using the Xilinx Platform Studio (XPS) 13.4 tools.
To measure FPGA resource utilization we used the the XPS post-place-
and-route synthesis reports, which provided information on the number of
slice LUTs, slice registers, DSP48E1 slices, and RAMB18E1 blocks used
in each prototype. To measure execution time we developed four, simple,
benchmarks in the C programming language. Each benchmark consisted of
two versions: a software-only implementation for the MicroBlaze processor,
and an implementation that invokes the corresponding ARABICA instruc-
tion. Table 2.2 shows the four benchmarks. We also used a Xilinx XPS
Timer/Counter IP core [13] to measure the number of clock cycles consumed
by different ARABICA instructions in each prototype. Because all our pro-
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TABLEAU 2.2: ARABICA instruction benchmarks
Benchmark Description
XOR4 Part of the CRC32 MiBench benchmark [54] (successive XOR operations).
MACC matrix multiplication.
MADD vector multiplication followed by matrix addition.
SPFADD2 successive additions of random, single-precision floating-point numbers.
totypes operate at 150 MHz, we used the resulting clock cycle counts as
measures of execution performance. Finally, we measured the average dy-
namic power consumed by each prototype directly from the ML605 board
using a Texas Instruments (TI) USB interface adapter evaluation module
(EVM) [10] and the TI Fusion Digital Power Designer software [9]. We also
estimated static power consumption using the Xilinx XPower Analyzer tool
[15].
2.4.4 Results
Resource Utilization
Figure 2.10 shows the FPGA resources used by the three prototypes. To
quantify resource utilization using a single metric, we calculated the geo-
metric mean of the resources used by each prototype and normalized the
results with respect to the MicroBlaze processor. Our results show that the
ARABICA and DCB use 0.39× and 0.96× the resources used by the Mi-
croBlaze processor, respectively, and that the ARABICA block uses 0.41×
the resources used by the DCB.
Execution Performance
Figure 2.11 shows the number of cycles consumed by the MicroBlaze proces-
sor and the ARABICA block for each of the benchmarks. These show that
the ARABICA block runs 12−37× faster than the MicroBlaze processor. The
ARABICA block also achieves the same performance as the DCB because
the latter uses the same MicroBlaze interface and hardware implementation
for each instruction.
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Power and Energy Consumption
Figure 4.10 shows the static, dynamic, and total power consumed by the
three prototypes. The results show that the ARABICA block consumes an
average of 0.77× the static power, 1.29× the dynamic power, and 0.93× the
total power consumed by the MicroBlaze processor. Given the significance
of the static to dynamic power ratio across all prototypes, the smaller total
power of the ARABICA block is mainly due to its smaller FPGA resource
footprint. On the other hand, the DCB consumes an average of 1.10× the
static power, 1.35× the dynamic power, and 1.17× the total power consumed
by the MicroBlaze processor. The larger total power of the DCB is again
due to its larger FPGA resource footprint. Our results also show that the
ARABICA block consumes an average of 0.70× the static power, 0.96× the
dynamic power, and 0.79× the total power consumed by the DCB. This
is mainly due to the more efficient use of arithmetic and logic resources of
the ARABICA block. Since the ARABICA block and the DCB achieve
an identical level of execution performance, the lower total power of the
ARABICA block translates directly to lower energy consumption. Figure
5.8(a) shows the energy consumed by each benchmark when executed on
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each of the three prototypes. The results show that the ARABICA block
uses 0.03 − 0.08× the energy consumed by the MicroBlaze processor, and
0.79× the energy used by the DCB. This noteworthy reduction in energy
consumption is related to the performance of the proposed architecture.
Discussion
The results of this Section show the possibility to implement a wide rabge of
diverse arithmetic and logic functions on top of a programmable unit with
high speed reconfiguration.
While the ARABICA block has clear resource, performance, and power
and energy consumption advantages, it is worth noting that significant re-
source and latency overheads are due to the constraints of the MicroBlaze
FSL interface used for testing platform. Table 2.3 shows the FPGA re-
source overhead of the input and output blocks, which varies from 27% of
ARABICA’s LUTs to 80% of its BRAMs. Figure 2.14 also shows the corre-
sponding latency overhead of the input and output blocks, which varies from
60% for the MACC instruction to 93% for the XOR4 instruction. These
limitations are not intrinsic to the design and can be avoided either partially
by using a high performance interface or completely by integrating the block
within the global processor datapath.
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TABLEAU 2.3: Test-platform Resource Overhead
EXEC IN/OUT Overhead
Slice Registers 210 60 29%
LUTs 1604 431 27%
DSP48E1 4 - 0%
BRAMs 5 4 80%
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Figure 2.14: Input/Output blocks latency overhead
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2.5 A DSP-based Reconfigurable Unit for
Signal Processing Applications
Signal processing (SP) applications are known to be among the highest per-
formance requiring applications. As these latter implement heavy algorithms
that manipulate huge amounts of data, embedded systems designers tend to
employ heterogeneous architectures to take advantage from Hardware ac-
celerators high-throughput computing. Nevertheless, Hardware accelerators
supporting SP applications are high resource-demanding systems which re-
sults in considerable power consumption overheads. Hence, dynamic recon-
figuration is used to overcome this problem through run-time reprogramming
and reuse of hardware resources. However, the long latency of fine-grain re-
configuration still represents a major bottleneck that limits the efficiency of
using PR in SP-oriented applications.
In this Section, we present a dynamically reconfigurable DSP-based IP,
that implements several signal processing kernels using shared resources. The
reconfiguration process takes only 1 clock cycle to be performed. The pro-
posed architecture further improves DSP-oriented embedded systems perfor-
mance while adding architectural flexibility. As an illustration to ARENA
approach, it implements the following applications within the same reconfig-
urable circuit:
• Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).
• Finite Impulse Response (FIR).
• Convolution Tree.
• Median Filter.
• Mean Filter.
2.5.1 Circuit Architecture
The proposed IP is implemented using DSP48E1 slices to carry on a set
of commonly used SP functions, namely, FFT, FIR, Convolution, Median
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Figure 2.15: Optimized Filtering Block for 2D Median filter [83]
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Figure 2.16: Resource Utilization Compared to Dedicated Circuits
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and Mean filters. As shown in Figure 2.18, the circuit merges the differ-
ent functions in one reconfigurable unit following ARENA approach. The
configuration circuit is not represented in Figure 2.18. Its role consists of
applying beforehand stored configuration vectors according to the desired
circuit. Hence, the reconfiguration occurs by assigning different DSP slices
functionality as well as MUXs’ select signals thereby determining the overall
circuit performed function. The comparing circuit is a unit used to imple-
ment the median filter. It is worth noting that the median filter architecture
is the optimized architecture proposed by [83] in which the comparison cir-
cuit forwards only necessary operands comparisons. Hence, the signal infi
∀i corresponds to the results (inferior or superior value) of the comparison
operation that is implemented using DSPi. Figure 2.15 corresponds to the
implemented median filter architecture. The signals Ci correspond to the
different filters coefficients and they are affected depending on the configura-
tion.
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Figure 2.18: Architecture of the reconfigurable DSP-based architecture
implementing FFT, FIR, Convolution, Median and Mean Filters
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2.6 Resource utilization and Power Con-
sumption
In this section, we evaluate the gain obtained by applying ARENA recon-
figuration technique in terms of power consumption and hardware resource
utilization. For this purpose, we design the different SP kernels cited above
separately in Dedicated circuits. The circuits are designed using Xilinx Vi-
vado Design suite 2013.1. The comparison with ARENA presented in Figure
2.16 shows that the proposed approach allows a reduction by 41%, 19% and
74% in Registers, LUTs and DSP48E1 slices respectively. Accordingly, in
terms of power consumption, Figure 2.17 shows that implementing circuits
using ARENA reduces both static and dynamic power considerably.
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, ARENA, a high-speed reconfiguration technique for DSP-
based circuits is proposed. It offers a good performance/flexibility compro-
mise and overcomes the reconfiguration bottleneck in conventional FPGA-
based designs. The efficiency of the proposed technique is exhibited by
the implementation of two dynamically reconfigurable widely used circuits,
namely, a reconfigurable coprocessor and a SP unit merging a set of common
filters. In addition to the high-speed reconfiguration, achievements in area
and power efficiency are performed by DSP48E1 slices sharing. We also pro-
vide a custom design tool that generates the reconfigurable circuit as well as
the different configuration vectors corresponding to the performed functions.
Chapter 3
Self Adaptive Redundancy for
Reliable Obstacle Detection
Systems
In this chapter, we propose a cross-layer model of circuits vulnerability.
We then use this model to build a self adaptive fault tolerant architecture
(ARDAS) that protects only vulnerable parts of the system.
3.1 Introduction
Technology scaling has enabled fabulous improvements in embedded sys-
tems performance. Nevertheless, as transistor gate dimensions decrease
to the nanometer scale, electronic systems become highly susceptible to
environmental-factors-induced errors. Soft errors are caused by single event
transients (SETs) that temporarily corrupt data stored in memory cells, or
change the state of internal combinational circuit nodes, thereby causing er-
rors to propagate to subsequent parts of the circuit [19].
SETs are voltage transients due to cosmic rays that ionize atoms and gen-
erate tracks of electron-hole pairs in semiconductor material. Excess charge
along these tracks collects at p-n junctions and causes a circuit’s state or
behavior to temporarily change [98]. In addition to increasing operating
frequencies and lower voltage levels, shrinking transistors size exacerbates
the problem by decreasing the capacitance per transistor. This in turn re-
duces the critical charge sufficient to flip the data stored in memory cells
or corrupt combinational gates outputs. The impact of SETs on SRAM
35
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cells, latches, flip-flops, and sequential circuits reliability has been exten-
sively studied. Nevertheless, their impact on combinational circuits is still
an open problematic. In fact, the capacity of particle-induced pulses to prop-
agate across combinational circuits increases the problem complexity [40].
Shrinking transistor sizes, increasing operating frequencies, and lower volt-
age levels are increasing the vulnerability of combinational circuits to soft
errors and undermining their reliability. For embedded systems in trains and
railway infrastructure the situation is even worse. Trains and the correspond-
ing infrastructure operate in a complex and non-homogeneous environment.
The railway environment is polluted by electromagnetic fields and low power
electronics embedded systems must operate closer to components with very
high voltages and currents from trains.
To design efficient fault tolerant electronic systems, an accurate estima-
tion of circuits failure rates is a crucial step. The masking phenomenon is one
of the fundamentals involved in failure rates estimation within semiconductor
circuits. Traditionally, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, three masking mechanisms
preventing combinational circuits from soft errors have been considered [41]:
logical masking, electrical masking and latching-window masking.
Logical masking (LM) happens when an error propagates to reach a gate’s
input while another input is in controlling state within the same gate: A ”0”
input of a NAND gate is an example. For example, if one input of a NAND
gate is equal to logic 0, an error on the gate’s second input will be masked.
Electrical masking is due to the electrical properties of the gates crossed by
the radiation-induced pulse. It happens when the voltage transient resulting
from a particle strike is attenuated by subsequent logic gates because of the
electrical property of the gate [66]. In this case, the pulse is masked before
reaching the sequential element.
When a transient pulse survives from logical masking and electrical mask-
ing, it can reach a sequential element either inside or outside its clock window.
Pulses that occur inside the clock window are latched and propagate to the
rest of the circuit. Latching-window masking, or temporal masking, happens
when the transient pulse occurs outside of the latching window for the sub-
sequent sequential element. A latching window is a duration bounded by the
setup time and hold time around the active clock edge of an edge-triggered
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latch [41].
In addition to the three common masking mechanisms, the transistor level
architecture of a struck gate can inhibit the error propagation into the struck
gate’s output. In fact, as explained later in Section 3.1, a particle strike
can be masked through a Transistor-Level-Masking (TLM) mechanism if a
corruption in the struck transistor behavior does not affect the overall gate
output. TLM depends on the specific affected transistor location within the
struck gate and by the input combination during the transient event.
In this Chapter we analyze the TLM mechanism and propose a SPICE
simulation-based model that estimates the probability of TLM at circuit level.
We generalize the model to the gate level and we include logical masking to
build an input-dependent model of soft error masking.
In addition to the circuit level study, we also extend our focus to system
level masking mechanisms in order to build a cross-layer reliability analysis.
In fact, we notice that a multitude of classification, detection and recogni-
tion applications are based on the comparison of a computed value with a
beforehand fixed threshold. Hence, as explained in Section 3.2, an accidental
modification in the intermediate result may keep the overall system decision
unchanged depending on the detection threshold value. Thereby, a bit flip in
a computational block does not necessarily lead to an erroneous result. Based
on this observation, we propose a model for System Level Masking (SLM) in
threshold-based systems. The proposed cross-layer approach helps designers
to quantify the actual vulnerability of their systems and consequently allows
them to build reliability enhancement techniques with lower overheads.
Traditionally, numerous hardened circuits against soft errors have been
proposed. They can be classified into two main families, namely space-
redundancy and time-redundancy approaches. While time redundancy re-
sults in a considerable performance penalty, the main weakness of spatial re-
dundancy is the huge area (and consequently power consumption) overhead.
In this Chapter, we present ARDAS: Adjustable Redundancy in DSP-based
Architectures for Soft errors resiliency, an architecture that uses adjustable
redundancy of DSP blocks to protect the vulnerable circuit parts instead of
protecting the whole circuit. The vulnerability analysis is performed through
design-time simulations that implement the proposed masking models (TLM
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and SLM). The cross-layer aspect of our approach leads to an accurate es-
timation of the circuit requirements in terms of reliability. We validate the
proposed analysis on a DSP-based correlator dedicated to RADAR-based
obstacle detection. Based on the estimation of vulnerability and taking ad-
vantage from the DSP slices flexibility, we dynamically affect the redundant
DSPs to the highly susceptible DSPs to soft errors. Unlike TMR reliability
enhancement technique, the redundant hardware resources in ARDAS are
shared between different parts of the circuit and the redundancy map can
be changed at run-time depending on the input combination to fit to the
vulnerability level of the different slices.
The main contributions of this Chapter are:
1. A SPICE simulation-based probabilistic model of TLM in combina-
tional circuits.
2. A SLM model for threshold-based applications.
3. A cross-layer vulnerability analysis based on the proposed masking
models (TLM and SLM).
4. We propose ARDAS and validate it on a radar-based obstacle detection
system for railway transportation control to build a low cost reliable
system.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide
the necessary background as well as a brief review of the literature on soft
errors, masking mechanisms and fault tolerance techniques. TLM and SLM
mechanisms modeling are explained in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we detail
ARDAS architecture while the experimental results of its application on an
obstacle detection circuit in railway transportation are shown in Section 3.5.
Finally, we conclude the Chapter and provide possible perspectives for our
work.
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Figure 3.1: Three soft error masking mechanisms
3.2 Background and Related Works
3.2.1 Soft Errors in Combinational Circuits
Many works on SER estimation in logic circuits have been recently proposed
[93, 94, 95]. Fault simulation method [39], Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs)
and Algebraic Decision Diagrams (ADDs) [23] based techniques have been
proposed to estimate the LM effect. Latching window mechanism has been
modeled accurately in [32] and the authors in [36] introduce the concept of
Window Of Vulnerability (WOV) to analyze temporal masking effect.
Electrical masking effect has been studied in [39] and the authors suggest
an accurate model based on the nonlinear properties of sub-micron MOS tran-
sistors for soft error tolerance analysis taking into account electrical, logical
and latching window masking. While [95] [39] and [33] separately evaluate
the impact of electrical, logical and latching window masking phenomena,
the authors in[76] propose MARS-C, a framework that provides a unified
representation of the three masking techniques. In [93], a symbolic technique
for estimating scaling error probability named FASER is proposed. FASER
can be applied to logical and electrical masking and takes clock frequency
into account.
Recently, process variation has become an issue and introduced new chal-
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lenges in the estimation accuracy of SER. A Statistical SER analysis that has
been presented in [33] [73] takes into account the impact of process variation
on the chip and models the three masking mechanisms. All the cited refer-
ences analyze the masking mechanisms as a key metric for SER estimation
in combinational circuits.
In our work, we consider a masking mechanism that inhibits the radiation-
strike-induced pulse in combinational circuits at the transistor level due to
the gate architecture. As we explain later, we implement our correlation
circuit using DSP48E1 slices to take advantage of their high performance
on the one hand, and their flexibility on the other. We also profit from
their programmability to develop a dynamic-redundancy-based fault toler-
ance technique.
3.2.2 Reliability Enhancement Techniques
In the literature, the most widely used reliability enhancement approaches
are: spatial redundancy and temporal redundancy. Spatial redundancy is im-
plemented by carrying out the same computation on multiple and indepen-
dent hardware units simultaneously. The most common spatial redundancy
method is TMR in which a circuit is replicated three times and Majority
Voters (MVs) are used to select the correct result and mask erroneous val-
ues. The main disadvantage of this method is its significant area and power
overheads. The second class of spatial redundancy techniques replicates crit-
ical nodes and uses feedback to recover the correct value after an upset.
The above technique is used in the immune cells that include the Heavy
Ion Tolerant (HIT) cell [36]. Another alternative to hardware redundancy is
time redundancy. This approach achieves redundancy by repeating the same
operation multiple times on the same hardware. A recent Double Time Re-
dundancy (DTR) technique has been proposed [29] as an alternative to Triple
Time Redundancy that trades-off the circuit throughput for a considerable
hardware overhead. Time redundancy technique greatly reduces the hard-
ware cost, but incurs high time penalty and consequently high performance
loss.
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3.3 Input-dependent Masking Mechanisms
3.3.1 TLM: Transistor-Level Masking Mechanism
TLM occurrence is led by the affected transistor locality within the struck
gate as well as the input combination during the transient event. In fact,
the particle strike temporarily corrupts combinational elements by affecting
the state of the hit transistor. However, the event can be simply unnoticed
at the output if the transistor behavior corruption doesn’t affect the overall
state of pull-up/pull-down network. For example, a faulty state of one of
two parallel pmos transistors in depletion mode doesn’t change the pull-up
network state. Consequently, the fault is inhibited at transistor level.
It is worth noting that in this chapter, we consider single event tran-
sients and suppose that the transient strike footprint doesn’t exceed one hit
transistor. In fact, it has been shown in [96] that the maximum range of
particle strike induced EHP radius is equal to 20 nm which is lower than the
transistor dimensions in the considered technology (45 nm).
Although both TLM and LM depend on the input data, their mechanisms
are totally different. Two main differences are cited below:
• Masking locality: the particle induced pulse in TLM case does not
propagate to the struck gate output and is masked within the internal
gate architecture. Hence, no subsequent gate is needed for error mask-
ing by TLM. However, in logical masking the pulse propagates through
the struck gate’s output and is masked later by a subsequent gate if
the error-free input is in a controlling state.
• Masking conditions: while TLM depends on both input combination
and struck transistor location within the gate architecture, LM depends
only on the error-free input of the subsequent gate to the struck one
and is totally independent from which transistor is hit.
Several algorithms in test-oriented studies modeled masking mechanisms
at transistor level within CMOS circuits. The considered cases in these works
correspond to permanent faults and are referred to as stuck-open and stuck-
short faults [67] [43]. Nevertheless, although soft errors masking mechanisms
CHAPTER 3. SELF ADAPTIVE REDUNDANCY FOR RELIABLE OBSTACLE DETECTION SYSTEMS42
have been extensively investigated, to the best of our knowledge there are no
published works that model the transistor level masking of transient errors
in combinational circuits.
For illustration, let’s consider the 2-input CMOS NAND gate shown in
Figure 5.3. Assume a radiation strike has upset the PMOS transistor Q3 of
the NAND gate. The behavior of this transistor is corrupted if the collected
charge due to a strike is greater than the node’s critical charge. Nevertheless,
if the input-combination is 00 then the second p-transistor (Q4) is activated
and it connects the output to Vdd even if Q3 doesn’t. Consequently, the
NAND gate output is not affected by the transient event and the output
remains at logic state 1 just like an error-free NAND gate. While in TLM,
the gate output is correct, LM corresponds to a corrupted output data that is
going to be masked later by a subsequent gate (not struck by the radiation)
whose result is completely determined by its other input values.
However, if the input combination is 01 then a strike-induced upset in
transistor Q3 will switch off this latter and break the link of the output
to Vdd. The error is in this case propagated and the output flips from
1 to 0. Therefore, in addition to the three common masking mechanisms
presented in Section 1, the error propagation depends also on the position of
the struck transistor within the gate and the input data. To validate the TLM
mechanism, we ran HSPICE simulations by injecting a current pulse at the
different gate nodes to emulate the injected pulse during a single event. The
impact of the simulated event is noticed on the gate output for the different
input combinations. We simulate gates behavior using a 45 nm technology
file from PTM [6].
Probability of TLM
To quantify TLM mechanism’s impact on gates susceptibility to soft errors,
we calculate the probability of soft error masking due to TLM for a given gate
based on the results obtained from Section 3.1. This probability is named
here PTLM . Let be Di a binary indicator for a given gate that shows if the
error due to a particle strike hitting a transistor Qi is masked by a TLM
mechanism. Di equals 1 if the particle strike hits the transistor Qi without
CHAPTER 3. SELF ADAPTIVE REDUNDANCY FOR RELIABLE OBSTACLE DETECTION SYSTEMS43
Figure 3.2: TLM Example: Radiation strike hitting PMOS transistor Q3 in
a Nand 2 gate within a C17 circuit. The error is masked when the inputs
are at ”00”
corrupting the output (TLM case), and 0 if the strike in Qi results in a
corrupted output. During an event, Pi is the probability that a transistor Qi
is hit by the particle. Hence, the probability that the error resulting from a
radiation strike is masked is equal to the sum of the probabilities Pi when
the affected transistor state Qi has no impact on the output. The probability
of a soft error TLM Pm for a given input combination is then expressed by:
Pm(out) =
NT∑
i=1
(Pi ∗Di) (3.1)
For a simplification reason, we suppose the equiprobability to be hit
by the particle strike between all the infected gates’ transistors. Pi is then
constant and is given by:
Pi =
1
NT
(3.2)
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TABLEAU 3.1: Probabilities of TLM of a NAND, XOR and AND logic
gates for the different input combinations
Nand Xor And
00 100 33.33 66.67
01 50 33.33 33.33
10 50 33.33 33.33
11 0 50 0
Where NT is the number of transistors in the considered gate. Let Nm
be the number of cases the error is masked for a given input combination.
Then equation 3.1 becomes:
Pm(out) =
Nm
NT
(3.3)
Table 3.1 shows the results of the SPICE-based probabilistic model de-
tailed above applied to two-input NAND, XOR and AND gates. It is clear
from the exposed masking probabilities that the impact of the TLM mech-
anism on soft error rates in logic gates is not negligible. in the case of a
00 input to the NAND gate, the probability of TLM reaches 100% which
means that in this case the gate is totally radiation-induced fault tolerant.
Therefore, taking this masking effect into account in the SER estimation of
combinational circuits will remarkably improve prediction and avoid possible
overheads in the soft error mitigation techniques. The next Section gener-
alizes the probabilistic model to the gate level. Then, we examine the C17
benchmark and a 4× 4 multiplier circuit in order to quantify their vulnera-
bility to soft errors taking into account the TLM effect.
Probabilistic Model
In this Section we examine soft error masking at the gate level. We suppose
that a particle hits a combinational circuit and produces a pulse that is large
enough to survive electrical and latching window masking. Hence we model
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the propagation of the transient radiation induced error while considering
both TLM and LM mechanisms. If Si is the i
th bit of the circuit output S
then, given the assumption above, the SET has no impact on Si in three
cases:
1. By TLM mechanism: if the error is masked at transistor level as shown
in the previous Section.
2. By LM mechanism: if the error survived from the TLM and forwarded
to a ”don’t care” input of a subsequent gate.
3. If the error survived from the two previous mechanisms and propagated
to an output (or more) other than Si.
Hence, the probability of soft error masking in the output bit Si for a given
input combination is:
Pm(Si) =
n∑
j=1
Wj · (PTLM(j) + (1− PTLM(j)) ·Dij) (3.4)
Where:
1. n is the number of gates in the combinational circuit,
2. PTLM(j) is the probability of TLM fr a gate j, and
3. Wj is the weight assigned to gate j and represents the area fraction.
Wj is expressed as the number of the gate’s transistors divided by the
total number of transistors in the circuit.
4. Finally, Dij is a binary variable set to 1 if the error at gate j does not
propagate to output Si. It is set to 0 otherwise.
Algorithm 2 calculates the probability of soft error masking at the circuit
outputs for a given input combination. Note that the golden run output
Sc(i) the output bit is compared with the bit under fault injection. This
latter corresponds to a circuit node bit flip. The output bit is then compared
with the golden run output Sc(i).
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Algorithm 2 Compute probability of error masking for an input combina-
tion Ic
Function ProbaMask()
Inputs: Circuit, Input Signals :Ic
Outputs: Pm
for i = 1 .. m do
/*m is the number of output bits*/
Pm(i)← 0 /* Initialize probability of masking output i */
for j= 1.. n do
n is the number of gates
injectError(j) /* Inject error in gate j */
if S∗i = Si then
Dij ← 1 /* the error is masked */
else
Dij ← 0
end
end
Pm(i)← Pm(i) +W (j)× (PTLM(j) + (1− PTLM(j))×Dij
end
end
Return (Pm);
We implemented the proposed model in the C language to simulate the
circuit’s error-free and faulty behaviors. We compute the masking probabil-
ities for input combinations. We first show the results corresponding to the
C17 circuit from the ISCAS’85 benchmark. Then, we run the simulation for
a full adder circuit and a 4 × 4 multiplier which corresponds to a simplified
version of the ISCAS’85 C6288 benchmark.
Results for C17 benchmark: To highlight the TLM effect on com-
binational circuits, we study the ISCAS’85 benchmark C17 circuit shown
previously in Fig 5.3. As the probability of both TLM and LM mechanisms
directly depends on the circuit input vector, we compare the impact of TLM
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on the circuit outputs vulnerability to soft errors with LM. The results shown
in Figure 3.3 demonstrate that TLM is, in most cases, more effective in re-
stricting soft error propagation than LM. In fact, for more than 59% of the
input combinations, the outputs mean probability of error masking due to
TLM is higher than LM probability.
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Figure 3.3: TLM and Logical Masking (LM) probabilities for the C17
benchmark
Results for a full adder: We run the simulations to explore the TLM
of a full adder circuit. The results shown in Figure 3.4 correspond to the four
possible cases:
1. 2M: the fault is masked at the two outputs (S and Cout) and the 2
output are valid .
2. SM CE: the fault is masked at the S output, but not at Cout. In this
case, S is valid but Cout is erroneous.
3. SE CM: the fault is masked at the Cout output, but not at S. In this
case, S is erroneous but Cout is valid.
4. 2E: the fault is not masked and both outputs are erroneous.
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Figure 3.4: Different masking probabilities of a full adder. The 3 input-bits
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Figure 3.4 shows that the probability that the two output bits of a
particle-struck full adder circuit are masked by TLM mechanism is between
0.4 and 0.5.
Results for 4 × 4 Multiplier: Figure 3.5 shows the 4 × 4 multiplier
architecture that is considered in this section. The multiplier is built using
AND gates and adders while the full adder circuit is composed of two AND,
two XOR and one OR gates. Hence, we first implemented the algorithm for
the full adder to measure the masking probabilities of the outputs at the sum
and carry-out outputs. Different input combinations were considered. Based
on the adder’s results, we identify the masking probabilities of the multiplier
outputs. The results shown in Figure 3.6 correspond to four significant input
combinations illustrating the behavior of the masking probability in terms of
input values. These results prove that the TLM has a considerable impact
on the SER estimation in combinational circuits. In fact, depending on the
input vector, a soft error may have a masking probability that can reach 47%
for a 4× 4 multiplier.
Hence, this information is valuable for analyzing combinational circuits
susceptibility to soft errors and consequently for circuit reliability estimation.
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Figure 3.5: Architecture of a 4× 4 multiplier
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Figure 3.6: Masking probabilities of a 4× 4 multiplier. S0 to S7 correspond
to the outputs.
3.3.2 SLM: System-Level Masking Mechanism
Modeling SLM
Figure 3.7 shows a simplified threshold-based system that is composed of a
processing element and a comparator. The comparison of the intermediate
result with a beforehand fixed threshold gives the overall system decision.
For example, the intermediate result in the radar-based obstacle detection
system considered in Section 5 consists of a correlation between input and
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Figure 3.7: General Architecture of a Threshold-based System
reference signals. Hence, a transient error in the intermediate result may keep
the overall system decision unchanged depending on the detection threshold
value. Thereby, a bit flip in a computational block does not necessarily
lead to a system failure. Based on this observation, we propose an in-depth
study of System Level Masking (SLM) impact in threshold-based systems to
investigate the impact of soft errors at system level. To this end, we consider
a widely used signal processing element in detection/recognition applications,
namely, a correlator. It is worth noting that the same methodology can be
applied on any other computing element of a threshold-based application.
We built a simulation platform that tracks the propagation of particle-strike-
induced errors happening within the correlator nodes and evaluated their
impact on obstacle detection accuracy. The correlator is implemented using
DSP48E1 slices [1]. Consequently, the considered nodes of the circuit are
the different output bits of the DSPs. A soft error is modeled by injecting
a bit flip in one of the circuit nodes. Once a fault is injected, the platform
simulates the error propagation in the circuit until the correlation output.
Hence, the system behavior can be monitored under fault injection through
system failures (SFs) detection. A SF occurs in two cases:
1. False Alarm: If the output after fault injection exceeds the correlation
threshold while the initial output value, i.e. without fault injection, is
lower than the threshold. This situation corresponds to a ”false alarm”.
2. No Alarm: A ”no alarm” case occurs if the injected fault transforms
the correlation result from higher than the threshold to lower than the
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threshold. It corresponds, in an obstacle detection system, to a non-
detected obstacle.
To identify SFs, we introduce an indicator δij that is expressed by:
δij = (Cij
∗ − Y0) · (C − Y0) (3.5)
Where Cij
∗ is the correlation result under fault injection in node (i, j), C is
the error-free correlation result and Y0 is the correlation threshold.
The circuit behavior under fault injection is then observed at the system
level via δij. A SF occurs when δij < 0. In this case the injected error
propagates through the circuit and manifests into the output as one of the
two SF cases mentioned above. However, if δij ≥ 0 we have a System Level
Masking (SLM). In this case, the injected error didn’t lead to a SF and it
has been masked at the system level. For a node (i, j) corresponding to the
output bit i of DSPj, depending on the sign of the corresponding δij, we
identify wether an obstacle detection failure is induced by the injected fault.
3.4 ARDAS: Adjustable Redundancy in
DSP-based Architectures for Soft errors
resiliency
3.4.1 Vulnerability Modeling
In the previous Section, we focused on input-dependent masking mechanisms.
We model these mechanisms for both circuit and system level. In this Section,
we combine the two masking mechanisms, TLM and SLM, to evaluate the
effective vulnerability of the system.
For a node (i, j), we define ηij, as an indicator of SLM. The variable ηij is
equal to 0 if a fault at node (i, j) is masked at the system level (i.e. δij ≥ 0).
Otherwise, if δij < 0, ηij is equal to 1. To measure the susceptibility of the
circuit to transient errors and their impact on the overall system behavior,
we need to take into account both circuit level and system level susceptibility
to errors. Hence, we define the vulnerability of a DSPj as the mean value of
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Figure 3.8: Simulation flowchart
the probability that a soft error manifests to its output bit i weighted by the
SLM indicator ηij. The vulnerability Vj is expressed by:
Vj =
∑Nj
i=1 ηij · (1− Pij)
Nj
(3.6)
Where:
• Nj is the number of output bits of DSPj
• Pij is the probability of soft error masking relative to bit i of DSPj
obtained through Algorithm 1.
Note that Vj = 1 corresponds to a vulnerable DSP and highly susceptibility
to soft errors. This case occurs when the following conditions take place:
∀i ∈ [1;Nj], Pij = 0 and ηij = 1
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In other words, every particle that hits the circuit survives from TLM
and manifests as an error into the output while every bit flip in a node (i, j)
leads to a SF.
On the other hand, Vj = 0 corresponds to a fully hardened DSP against
soft errors:
∀i ∈ [1;Nj], Pij = 1 or ηij = 0.
A DSP in this case does not need any additional circuitry to protect
it from SETs. As the two masking mechanisms affecting the vulnerability
are input-dependent, Vj of DSPj varies depending on the data input values.
Consequently, for every input combination, the circuit vulnerability map is
represented by a vector that corresponds to the values of Vj ∀j ∈ [1;Ndsp].
Where Ndsp is the number of DSP48E1 slices within the circuit. As Vj gives
a metric of susceptibility to transient errors, instead of applying TMR to the
whole circuit, we use Vj to identify the vulnerable DSP slices and protect
them. In the proposed approach, we compare the DSP vulnerability to a
fixed threshold V0 and localize the DSPs whose Vj > V0. The vulnerability
threshold V0 indicates the desired reliability level and is fixed by the user
at design time. The higher V0 is, the more reliable the circuit becomes. To
simplify the representation, we define αj as follows:
αj = 0 if Vj > V0 and
αj = 1 if Vj ≤ V0
As αj indicates if DSPj is considered as vulnerable or not for a given in-
put combination, we call αj vector: DSPs Vulnerability Distribution (DVD).
Hence, for every input combination, the 0 values of the DVD represent the
DSPs that need TMR to ensure the whole circuit’s requested level of relia-
bility. The probability of an error manifestation represents the whole circuit
susceptibility to soft errors. We call it Global Vulnerability (GV) and express
it as follows:
GV =
∑
i
∑
j (1− Pij) · ηij
NT
(3.7)
Where NT is the total number of nodes within the circuit.
Given Vj expression given by Equation 3.6, GV is then expressed by
Equation 3.8
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GV =
∑
j Vj ·Nj
NT
(3.8)
Based on TLM and SLM, we run simulations as shown in the flowchart
in Figure 4.8 to get Vj, αj and GV . As Vj vector depends on the applied
input signals, the redundancy distribution corresponding to the vulnerability
map has to be dynamically tunable and self adaptive. The cross-layer design
time exploration steps are summarized in Figure 3.9. In the next Section, we
explain the reconfigurable redundancy approach.
3.4.2 Proposed Approach
The main idea of ARDAS is to judiciously use the redundant DSP slices
to carry out a partial TMR instead of a full TMR. The system adapts the
redundancy to the actual vulnerability map of the circuit. Using the cir-
cuit’s DVD obtained from design-time simulations, ARDAS assigns redun-
dant slices specifically to vulnerable DSPs, i.e. slices with αj = 0. Hence,
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unlike the conventional TMR approach, the redundant resources in ARDAS
are shared between the different original circuit’s DSP slices and dynamically
assigned to the vulnerable parts. The reuse of redundant resources by differ-
ent DSPs avoids the huge area overhead found in conventional TMR. Figure
3.10 illustrates a DSP-based architecture with flexible redundancy. The re-
dundant DSP slices can be dynamically affected to one of the initial DSPs
to enhance its reliability. The interconnection is controlled through the ”se-
lect” signal to route the redundant hardware according to the corresponding
reliability map. Hence, instead of tripling all DSP blocks as commonly done
in TMR, only vulnerable DSPs are protected.
The protected circuit is composed of the original DSPs and a set of addi-
tional slices that are dedicated to improve the original system reliability. The
number of redundant DSP slices used for the whole circuit, and covering all
input combinations, is determined at design time simulations. It depends on
the requested reliability level and consequently on the vulnerability threshold
V0. For a given input combination, the number of additional DSPs is twice
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the number of zeros in the αj vector as a DSP needs two redundant slices to
be protected. Hence, the overall number of redundant slices is the maximum
redundant DSP number among all tested input signals.
The reconfiguration process used to change the redundancy mapping at
run-time is taken from Chapter 2. Using the proposed reconfiguration tech-
nique, the DSP network can be reconfigured in a single clock cycle allowing
to quickly switch between different redundancy maps at run time. Repro-
gramming and routing the DSP48E1 slices enables us to modify the struc-
tural organization and functionality of the DSP-based circuit. The circuit
mapping is configured by a single control word according to a redundancy
map obtained oﬄine through design-time simulations. The bit fields of a
configuration vector determine the structural organization of the redundant
DSP blocks by enabling the interconnection paths that organize slices within
specific vulnerable structures.
ARDAS architecture assigns TMR to all DSP slices with αj = 0. Con-
sequently, if we suppose that a TMR-protected DSP slice is fully hardened
(Vj = 0), the GV expression becomes:
GV =
∑Ndsp
j=1 Vj ×Nj × αj
NT
(3.9)
In Figure 3.11 we show the impact of the vulnerability threshold (V0) on
the GV and the number of redundant DSPs. The results are shown for a
correlation circuit with the characteristics presented in Table 3.2. In near 0
vulnerability threshold values, all DSP slices are considered vulnerable and
we fall in a conventional TMR case. Nevertheless, increasing V0 leads to a
reduced number of redundant DSPs and consequently to rising circuit GV.
Note that a range of V0 can keep the GV unchanged depending on the DSP
slices elementary vulnerabilities Vj.
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Figure 3.11: Redundant DSPs and Global Vulnerability in terms of
Vulnerability Threshold
TABLEAU 3.2: The correlation circuit characteristics
Number of inputs 80 (2 sets of 40 samples)
Input sample length 8 bits
Output word length 22 bits
Nbr of DSPs (original circuit) 79
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3.5 Application Case: Obstacle Detection in
Railway Infrastructure Control System
The railway environment constitutes one of the most aggressive operating
conditions of embedded systems. Moreover, electronic systems implement a
continuously increasing number of applications for several purposes such as
safety, users comfort...etc. Therefore, a cost-aware reliability enhancement of
the hardware supporting those applications is a crucial task. In this section,
we present the application of ARDAS on a radar-based obstacle detection
system dedicated to critical spots surveillance in a railway infrastructure.
The general architecture of a radar-based obstacle detection system is shown
in Figure 3.12. It consists of 3 functional units: the UWB radar, the signal
preprocessing and the correlation circuit. In the following experiments, a
Gegenbauer-pulse-based Ultra Wide Band (UWB) radar with 3 GHz band-
width is used. The radar scans periodically with a time of 25 ms. At the
reception, the sampling procedure and the Analog Digital Conversion (ADC)
are first performed. An impulse signal S˜ is periodically sent by the Radar
transmitter. The reflected signal R˜ corresponds to a vector of N˜ samples:
R˜ = {r˜0, · · · , r˜N˜−1}. R
′ is the reference signal and corresponds to the im-
pulse signal transmitted from the transmission antenna Tx to the reception
antenna Rx. It is a M˜ -element vector R′ = {r′0, · · · , r
′
M˜−1
} [71][92].
At the reception, a correlation between R˜ and R′ is calculated to deter-
mine first the obstacle distance (equation 3.10).
Td = fc(R˜⊗R
′) =
N˜−1∑
i=0
M˜−1∑
j=0
(r˜i+j × r
′
j) (3.10)
The signals shown in Figure 3.13 correspond to the registered signature
of radar signals corresponding to the most frequently encountered obstacles
at the considered location, namely: train, car and pedestrian signals, respec-
tively. These signatures have been collected in ideal situation with reduced
noise. An overall view of the correlation circuit with ARDAS architecture is
shown in Figure 3.15.
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In our experiments, the noisy frequencies with high amplitudes are filtered
before being applied to the correlation circuit inputs. In order to study the
noise impact on our system’s output, we assume that the remaining noise
signals after filtering follow a normal distribution. Based on experimen-
tal measurements, we identify the mean value and the standard deviation
thereby realizing that 95% of the noise samples can be encoded on two bits.
As a matter of fact, the evaluation of the noise impact on the circuit vul-
nerability map is noticed in the cases corresponding to the ”near correlation
threshold” set. Hence, for every input obstacle signal corresponds a vulnera-
bility map selected by the six most significant bits of the input samples. A
default configuration is set in case of none of the predefined cases matches
with the input. In our experiments, the default map was chosen by setting
the multiplexers select signals to ”0”.
3.5.1 Reliability Enhancement
In this section, we compare the SER of ARDAS-protected to a TMR-
protected correlation circuit as it gives the highest error mitigation level.
We report the evolution of the reliability level provided by ARDAS in terms
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of V0. SER is commonly expressed in Failure in Time (FIT) and defines
the expected number of errors in 109 hours at a given environment. In our
case, we are considering the neutron flux at New York (NY) as reference
(13n/(cm2.h)) [4]. FIT is the product of the flux with the cross-section. It
is described in the following expression:
SER =
SF
particles/cm2
∗ (13n/(cm2.h)).109 (3.11)
Where cross-section quantifies the sensitivity of the implemented circuit
to a specific radiation source [86] and is defined as the ratio between the
number of SETs producing a system failure (SF) and the number of hitting
particles. As the reliability level is tuned via V0, Figure 3.14 represents the
normalized SER and the number of used DSP slices in ARDAS in terms of
the tolerated DSP vulnerability threshold.
As seen in Figure 3.14, the reliability level provided by ARDAS is com-
parable to TMR reliability level but with lower HW resource utilization. In
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Figure 3.16: Execution time comparison of the different architectures for
two different frequency configurations
fact, with a minor rise in the SER offered by TMR, ARDAS can preserve
more than 50% of the additional DSPs dedicated to enhance the circuit’s re-
liability when V0 = 0.7. Therefore, ARDAS offers the designer the ability to
choose the desired reliability level at design time through the tolerated vul-
nerability threshold. Accordingly, the reliability/resource-utilization tradeoff
can be carried out depending on the application criticality level.
3.5.2 Power, area and performance overheads
In addition to the reliability, we investigate the impact of ARDAS on power
consumption, FPGA resource utilization and the maximum clock frequency
of each circuit. For our application, we tested the circuit for two vulnera-
bility threshold values: 0.55 and 0.7. The circuit is implemented using ISE
Xilinx v14.1 and synthesized for a Xilinx Virtex 7 board. The power con-
sumption is estimated using the Xilinx XPower Analyser tool [89]. Note
that the power consumption results correspond to the circuits running un-
der a frequency of 150 MHz. For our experimentations, we implemented
the original circuit, TMR-protected, ARDAS and Double Time Redundancy
Transformation (DTR) [29].
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TABLEAU 3.3: Resource utilization, power and maximum frequency for
the original circuit, TMR and ARDAS.
Original TMR ARDAS(V0=0.55) ARDAS(V0=0.7) DTR
DSPs 79 237 189 159 79
LUTs 0 1798 1619 1207 1413
Pw(mW) 430 691 542 533 459
Max freq 422 247 347 347 410
(MHz)
Table 3.3 shows that our architecture can reduce the reliability cost in
terms of resource utilization, power and performance. Even though ARDAS
implementation uses additional circuitry for its flexible interconnection, the
overall fabric utilization remains lower than TMR’s overhead due to majority
voters. In fact, ARDAS decreases the number of used LUTs by 10% for V0 =
0.55 and by 32% for V0 = 0.7 compared to TMR. On the other hand, while
using TMR slows down the circuit frequency by 42%, ARDAS performance
penalty is less than 18% compared to the unprotected circuit. To further
investigate the performance impact of ARDAS, we compare the necessary
time for one dataset processing of the original circuit, TMR, ARDAS and
DTR. Figure 3.16 shows the execution time results for the different circuits
in two cases:
1. Each circuit is running under its maximum frequency (given in Table
3.3).
2. All the circuits are running under the same low frequency (150 MHz).
Figure 3.16 shows that among the considered reliability enhancement tech-
niques, ARDAS has the highest throughput. In fact, even if its maximum
frequency is lower than DTR, this latter suffers from a performance limita-
tion due to the time redundancy penalty. Results in Figure 3.16 and Table
3.3 thereby prove that ARDAS is an interesting alternative to conventional
space and time redundancy approaches. In fact, it insures a relevant balance
between reliability enhancement overheads in terms of throughput and area.
CHAPTER 3. SELF ADAPTIVE REDUNDANCY FOR RELIABLE OBSTACLE DETECTION SYSTEMS64
3.6 Conclusion and future works
In this chapter, a self adaptive reliability approach is proposed to cope with
the increasing error rates in new technologies with the lowest possible over-
heads. The proposed reliability enhancement method (ARDAS) benefits from
circuits’ self-immunity to reduce redundant hardware resources utilized for re-
liability enhancement. In fact, it relies on a flexible redundancy architecture
to protect the vulnerable parts of the system rather than the whole circuit.
The vulnerability estimation is based on a new cross-layer error masking
model that combines transistor and system level masking mechanisms. Due
to its quick reconfigurability and flexible redundancy, ARDAS offers high re-
liability with reduced area, power consumption and performance overheads.
Moreover, it allows designers to choose the desired reliability level depending
on the application requirements and its criticality. In fact, the tolerated vul-
nerability threshold controls the reliability map and consequently tunes the
overall system immunity.
We tested the proposed approach on a DSP-based correlator used for
obstacle detection in railway transportation. Experimental results show that
ARDAS provides a comparable reliability level with TMR while reducing
FPGA resource utilization by 45% in terms of LUTs and by 33% in terms of
DSP slices.
We think that the proposed cross-layer vulnerability model would be use-
ful for efficient and low overhead fault tolerant architectures. Furthermore,
in our future works, a generalization of this approach will be explored to take
advantage from the circuits intrinsic immunity in a wider range of applica-
tions as well as to consider Multiple Event Upsets within new circuits.
Chapter 4
Register File Reliability
Enhancement Through
Adjacent Narrow-width
Exploitation
This chapter describes an architecture level technique to enhance RF relia-
bility.
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, as sub-micron technology dimensions sharply decreased to
a few nanometer range, new types of challenges are introduced. Reliability
of electronic circuits is one such concern which calls for more investigation.
Since microprocessors are becoming more vulnerable to various types of faults
than past.
Due to the increasing vulnerability of CMOS circuits, new generations of
microprocessors require an inevitable focus on reliability issues. Protecting
processors against various types of faults, including those caused by high-
energy particles or instabilities of process variation, get increasing attention
from researchers. As the Register File (RF) constitutes a critical element
within the processor pipeline, it is mandatory to enhance the RF reliability
to develop fault tolerant architectures. This Chapter proposes Adjacent Reg-
ister Hardened RF (ARH), a new RF architecture that exploits the adjacent
byte-level narrow-width values for hardening registers at runtime. Registers
are paired together by some special switches referred to as joiners. Dummy
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sign bits of each register are used to keep redundant data of its counterpart
register. We use 7T/14T SRAM cell [46] to combine redundant bits together
to make a single bit cell which is, by far, more resilient against faults.
Nowadays, random variation in manufacturing process causes more pro-
duction yield loss and increase number of instabilities in chip die. Addi-
tionally sensitivity of chips are also intensified by voltage scaling since Vdd
diminishes as feature size does so. It also decreases by dynamic voltage
scaling (DVS), which, for dense and power hungry circuits is a widely used
power reduction technique. As supply voltage dwindles, by technology or
DVS, noise margin also decreases proportionally. Thereby undesirable and
accidental faults become more frequent.
Alongside process variation and voltage scaling, radiation of high energy
particles (soft error or single event upset or SEU) is another major source
of faults in circuits. Such radioactive particles originate from impurities
inside chip package or cosmic rays. It has been shown that with decrease
in transistor size, two opposing factors of reduction of critical charge and
reduction of area exposed to radiation almost cancel each other and soft
error rate (SER) per memory bit, does not increase sharply [24]. However by
growing chip density, SER per system grows. Similarly in newer technologies,
particles with lower energy are able to induce fault causing an increase in
SER.
Error rate is classified into two categories:
1) Bit error rate (BER): is the frequency of errors occur because of voltage
reduction or random variation in manufacturing process.
2) Soft error rate (SER): is the frequency of errors occur because of radiation
of high energy particles.
Faults in combinational part of digital systems are becoming more impor-
tant than before. In fact, higher frequencies increase the probability of such
faults being captured in sequential parts. Moreover, protecting microproces-
sors memory and sequential elements is also critical because of its direct im-
pact on systems reliability and data correctness. Cache memory, register file
(RF), flip-flop (FF) and latch are usual sequential parts of a microprocessor
architecture, each of which requires its own suitable solutions for reliability
enhancement. Both cache and RF are based on SRAM memory structure.
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However, since their characteristics and applications differ, their prevalent
reliability techniques also differ. In caches, Error Correction Code (ECC) is
an effective technique for protection against faults. However, unlike cache,
due to timing and power overheads, ECC is not an appropriate solution for
register file reliability. In RF, activity rate per address is higher than cache
memories, making power consumption more important. Additionally, RF is
in processor’s critical path and priority of performance is an essential neces-
sity. Consequently, finding suitable technique for RF reliability enhancement
is a new kind of challenge when compared to cache memories.
In this chapter, we propose a relatively different approach to exploit va-
cant spaces in RF to keep redundant data. This novel idea combines both
architectural and circuit techniques to achieve more robustness in RF. Pro-
vided that one of two SRAM cells is vacant, meaning it is filled with a dummy
sign bit, those two SRAM cells are joined together in circuit level by means
of two transistors to make one more robust SRAM cell. The signals to apply
this joining is issued by a reliability control unit.
This chapter is organized as following: In Section II, some of recent works
are reviewed. In Section III, proposed architecture is described in detail. In
Section IV, experimental results are presented. Finally, conclusion and future
works are explained.
The present work here has been realized in cooperation with Pr Ozcan
Ozturk and M. Hamzeh Anghari from Bilkent Universty (Turkey), in the
framework of the SEASCAP PHC project between France and Turkey.
4.2 Related Work
ECC is one of most commonly used architecture level technique for memory
protection [35]. It is a preferable solution due to its simple implementation.
However, the overheads associated with ECC can be significant. For ex-
ample, a Single Error Correcting Double Error Detecting (SECDED) code
needs 7 check-bits to protect 32 bit data, thereby requiring a memory size in-
creas of 22%. This results in considerable power dissipation and access delay
overheads. Therefore, ECC is not an efficient technique for RF reliability im-
provement. Most of studies for RF aim at utilizing information redundancy
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techniques. We review some of the most prominent and similar works here
and clarify their difference with our work.
In some studies, register duplication is proposed. For example, in [75] by
means of register renaming unit, unused registers are detected and exploited
to preserve redundant copies of other registers.
In-Register Duplication (IRD) is proposed in [59, 60] in which, by an
opportunistic idea, dummy sign bits of narrow-width register values are re-
placed with replication of meaningful bits during RF write operation. For a
64-bit RF, based on distribution of length of operands, extracted from bench-
marks, registers are divided into three classes. Those by length of less than
32, between 32 and 34, and more than 34. For first two classes which have
dummy sign bits, IRD is applied. ALU detects such sign bits and replaces
them with meaningful bits of data. Later, in read operation, replicated and
original bits are bit-wise compared to find mismatch as error indication. Ad-
ditionally, two parity bits are embedded for each half. By means of both error
detection mechanisms, which together are similar to a 2D parity system, they
added error detection/recovery for narrow width values stored in RF. Extra
circuit for detecting effective length, applying replication and comparison are
all collected in execution stage with ALU. Duplication is done on the out-
put of ALU, whereas communication path from ALU output to RF input is
also protected against transient faults. Nevertheless, long operands are not
protected by IRD. If applied to 32-bit RF, this disadvantage is more serious,
because long operands are frequent.
In [65], authors propose an extension to previous work [59]. In addition
to short operands, long operands are also protected by this approach. In
32-bit RF, for long operands, values are replicated in other unused registers,
similar to [75]. For avoiding negative effect on performance, two stages are
added to pipeline for detecting efficient length first, and later performing sign
extension in read operation.
All of the above-mentioned works are architectural level ideas based on
information redundancy and explicit comparison operation. Since our ap-
proach is a narrow-width approach, in a way, it is similar to some of them.
The main difference is that we combined a hardening technique with narrow
width duplication. In addition to reducing bit error rate, by clever replication
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Figure 4.1: The percentage of appearance in the 32-bit RF of the different
effective lengths (in byte).
in two paired registers, unlike IRD works [59, 60], we protect long operands
better than previous works. Provided that a long operand is next to a short
one, priority is given to long operand and replication of its more significant
bits are done on dummy sign bits of short operand.
4.3 Proposed Architecture: Adjacent Regis-
ter Hardening (ARH)
Our approach tries to improve reliability of RF by exploiting unused bits of
integer numbers in adjacent registers for hardening cells. The main focus of
this work is on integer type but can be generalized for other types. For any
number in range of minimum to maximum possible values in 2’s complement
system, only one single sign bit is sufficient for correct representation of the
number. The remaining sign bits are just multiple copies of the same sign bit
and are vain redundant bits. Based on this, instead of preserving multiple
redundant bits for sign, we suggest to exploit the redundant bits to enhance
the reliability of adjacent registers. Adjacent Register Hardening (ARH)
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is very efficient to protect highly critical data within an application using
dummy bits of non- critical registers.
This is even more pronounced for integer values with smaller magnitude.
That is, they have more dummy bits which consequently provide more re-
sources for the RF’s reliability enhancement. Small numbers have less num-
ber of bits to be protected too. Considering this fact, a uniform distribution
of large and small numbers which is expected from a typical application, fits
properly in this approach. Since the content of registers are unveiled at run
time, the extent of reliability increase is application dependent. Figure 4.1
shows that numbers with one byte effective length represent more than half
of the numbers stored in the RF in average for the benchmarks tested.
The cross-layer aspect of such approach is as important as the idea itself.
In fact, the implementation consists of retrieving the data to store and the
technical solution to enhance reliability and perform the different read/write
access. Instead of merely high-level architectural solutions, in our implemen-
tation we get benefit from a fast circuit level technique. As detailed in next
section, unlike redundancy-based approaches, ARH does not need explicit
voting, since circuit-level hardening technique is used. By combining archi-
tectural and circuit-level techniques we reach to a highly flexible reliability
solution.
Systems’ higher layers like operating system or compiler are oblivious to
the existence of a circuit-level mechanism. Therefore, it does not impose
any strict requirement on those higher layers. However, if additional system
requirements exist, like criticality of some data, compiler can consider this
in register allocation. Dynamic run-time register renaming mechanism can
also distribute registers in a better way based on effective length. Such
improvements will be our next steps in our future works.
4.3.1 Circuit Level Reliability Enhancement
7T/14T [46] proposed combining two SRAM cells in circuit level to achieve
more reliability or performance dynamically (Figure 4.2 left). According to
this idea, two memory cells are joined together upon request to store single
bit of data into two cells. Joining is done by means of activating two transis-
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Figure 4.2: Left: 7T/14T memory cell with nMOS joiners [46] right:
JSRAM cell with nMOS joiners[17].
tors which connect the internal nodes of two cells to each other. For biasing
toward reliability, just one of the wordline signals is used for read or write op-
eration (it is called dependable mode). On the other hand, to get more perfor-
mance both wordlines can be used simultaneously (high-performance mode).
If neither cases are required, the joiners are not activated (CTRL=”L”, if
switches are nMOS), then the proposed structure works normally as two
separated conventional 6T SRAM cells.
7T/14T structure has more reliability due to mutual support from two
cells. If there is an instability in one cell, the other one provides more re-
sistance against it. Additionally, in high-performance mode, it has more
performance in terms of speed of read operation because read current is pro-
vided by two cells. It also allows bigger dynamic voltage reduction because of
increased static noise margin (SNM). However, since in this work, as we will
see, a combination of joined and normal bits may exist inside a single register
(i.e., some bits are protected, some are not), we only consider the reliabil-
ity enhancement benefit, not additional voltage reduction nor performance
improvement benefits.
JSRAM cell [17] is an extension of 7T/14T cell to combine four cells in a
ring fashion to achieve full immunity against single bit errors by providing an
auto correction mechanism (Figure 4.2 right). It is also capable of tolerating
multiple bit upsets (MBUs). Since the reliability enhancement in our current
work is in a statistical way and is dependent on the values stored in registers,
using 7T/14T cell is more suitable.
In our proposed architecture, adjacent registers of RF are joined together
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by 7T/14T technique. Generally, each bit can be joined to any number of
bits from any register by embedding multiple switches in between. Neverthe-
less, to avoid excessive area overhead and complexity, we limit this idea by
just allowing each bit to be joined into single bit of a single specific register.
Thus, registers are paired together bit by bit during RF design. For example,
reg0-reg1,. . . , reg30-reg31. The joiner switches are embedded between these
registers to join them when it is needed. This pairing can be done in different
ways. For example joining registers with more distances like reg0-reg4,. . . ,
reg27-reg31 is also feasible. The benefit of such pairing is to have less proba-
bility of being affected by MBU, but obviously with more routing overhead.
Currently we opt to combine neighbor registers.
It is important to note that 7T/14T does not provide full immunity by
removing the adverse effect of fault factors completely. It reduces the prob-
ability of faults by resisting against weak disturbances. In any condition, a
strong adverse factor, like a radiation strike by a potent high energy particle,
can corrupt one of the two joined cells. If it lasts for long enough, corrupted
cell can push and corrupt the other cell too.
4.3.2 Architecture Level Organization
To enhance the RF error resiliency, we take advantage of the reconfigurable
aspect of the 7T/14T cell. Instead of relying on ECCs or extra memory
space for reliability enhancement, we opt for an opportunistic approach that
exploits unused bits within the stored data. Two paired registers may have
up to 32 distinct control signal (ctrl) for having bit-level granularity to join
individual bits separately (each bit to its counterpart bit). However, this
granularity level is not suitable due to its high area overhead. To optimize
the reconfiguration circuitry as well as the additional bit cells, we opted for a
byte-level width granularity. Accordingly, the idle bytes are used to harden
registers against errors.
Considering byte level granularity, a clever one-to-one mapping between
bytes of two registers is required to exploit the empty bits efficiently. Dummy
sign bits are on the left-hand side (MSB side), while real data bits are on the
other side. Thus, first obvious paradigm of mapping is in a crossed way, byte-
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Figure 4.3: Some possible combinations for byte mapping.
0 of one register to byte-3 of the paired register, byte-2 to byte-1 and so on.
However we’ve taken into account a second point in byte mapping. Faults
in more valuable bits of an integer, lead to more absolute numerical error.
Therefore, alternative mappings are also worth to be investigated (Figure
4.3).
While the best mapping is application dependent, we extracted the dis-
tribution of operand length for our benchmarks as shown in Figure 4.1.
Operands with lengths one and four bytes are dominant ones. Then paired
registers of length one-one, one-four and four-four are more frequent. This
means byte mapping has to be biased toward protecting one-one and one-
four combinations (four-four can not be protected anyway). Accordingly,
combination (a) in Figure 4.3 is not a good option, because it cannot protect
one-one case. Among the rest, b is more preferable because more valuable
bytes are protected in the case of one-four combination. Hence, by limiting
ourselves to at most four groups of byte-to-byte joiners, we take mapping of
Figure 4.3(b) as most efficient one which leads to better RF error resiliency.
For a 32-bit RF, four control signals are required for any of aforementioned
mappings.
For example in the case of mapping Figure 4.3(b), if ”ZYXW” and ”V”
hexadecimal values are stored in reg-i and reg-i+1 respectively, dummy sign
bits are filled with redundant values as illustrated in Figure 4.4. For having
easier routing, bytes can be reordered in one of the registers. In Figure
4.4:bottom, reg-i+1 is reordered. But this requires two multiplexers in input
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Figure 4.4: Top: Three bytes of ”ZYXW” number in reg-i are replicated in
sign bits of reg-i+1. ”V” number in reg-i+1 is not replicated. Bottom: easy
routing by byte reordering.
and output of register file to reorder during write and recover proper order
during read (Figure 4.5).
One superiority of our work in comparison to In-Register Duplication
(IRD) works is that, by pairing registers, ARH can protect long operands.
For example, in Figure 4.4, reg-i takes four bytes and three of these bytes
are protected by reg-i+1 which takes only one byte. However in IRD, long
operands which represent larger integers are not protected.
Below, we describe the mechanism for basic write/read operations:
Write Access
Mechanism behind the write operation is critical to achieve efficiency. During
write operation, only meaningful bytes are written, while dummy sign bits
should not be written and respective bytes in register are left intact. Because
those bytes may be keeping the redundant data of the paired register. This
can be satisfied by having byte selectable write enables. Besides this, while
those meaningful bytes are being written and if their counterpart bytes are
not in use, control signal of joiners are activated. According to electrical
characteristics of 7T/14T cell, if joiner is activated and one of the paired
cells is written, the other one is also written. By exploiting this properly,
redundant data is quickly written at the same time into the redundant byte
inside paired register by single write operation.
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Figure 4.5: Left: Write Access Circuit, Wordline and Joiner Signals Right:
Read Access Multiplexer
Abovementioned mechanism requires modification to ALU and RF de-
coder. As shown in Figure 4.6, ALU should simply detect effective length of
integer. In addition to storing data within the targeted register address, 2-
bit effective length value (LE) is also stored beside the register (Figure 4.5).
As mentioned earlier, instead of single write enable for each register, here
there are four write enable signals, one for each byte. Considering LE value,
only necessary byte-selectable write enable signals are activated to write only
effective length of data to register. This is shown by AND gates in Figure
4.5.
By means of already stored LE of the paired register (paired register of
the register being written), unused bytes of paired register are determined
to store redundant data. Then proper control signals (for any byte mapping
paradigm of Figure 4.3) are generated by using two level AND-OR circuit
(Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.6: Simplified datapath for RF write access including EL detection
During the write access, the reliability controller sets the configuration
to adapt the available idle bytes to protect the data which is being written.
Although extra circuitry of reliability controller, which is illustrated in Figure
4.5, is on critical path, by combining it with decoder during logic synthesis,
the delay overhead is minimized. For easier routing for byte mapping, bytes
of write data can be reordered for odd or even registers. This operation is in
parallel with decoder and not on critical path.
Read Access
The read access architecture is modified to cope with the reliability enhance-
ment process. Once a register’s idle bytes are exploited for hardening cells,
they should be replaced with actual sign value within the read access to
insure data integrity.
As shown in Figure 4.5 right, the reliability controller selects whether the
forwarded data would be the directly read bytes or the sign byte, depending
on the register effective width. If the byte-reordering has been already em-
ployed in write operation, actual order have to be recovered again. To avoid
timing overhead of detecting sign bit, sign bit can also be stored explicitly like
EL values in write operation, otherwise it is determined by finding MSB bit
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of most significant byte. All these are performed by a multiplexer as depicted
in Figure 4.5 right. This multiplexer selects one of four inputs: directly read
byte, reordered byte, all 0/1 for sign extension of positive/negative numbers.
4.4 Experiments
Fujiwara et.al. proposed an SRAM circuit that combines two memory cells for
one bit information through a controllable connection to enhance SRAM cells
reliability. The detailed characteristics of 7T/14T are available in [45, 46].
For confirming circuit functionality and calculating area and power over-
heads, simulation with HSPICE was performed with 22nm predictive tech-
nology model library [5]. Transistor sizes for typical 22nm SRAM cell were
chosen from [80]. Ratio values are: Cell ratio = WPD/WPG = 2.02 and
pullup ratio = WPU/WPG = 1.18. Wordline pulse width is chosen as 1ns.
We selected typical values of original BER and SER and improved rates
using 7T/14T SRAM cell form [45] and [91]. Although those experimental
results are related to SRAM chip fabricated in different technology (65nm
and 150nm), we only considered the improvement ratios not the exact values.
• BER of read operation: 7T SRAM cell (same as 6T) = 5.0X10−4, 14T
in dependable mode = 1.0X10−8 [45] (in [45] BER of write and hold
are also available, but we took read as most critical one).
• SER of 14T is improved by 80% over SER of 7T SRAM cell (same as
6T)[91]. We assumed SER = 10−7 as typical unprotected SER [59].
Given that, although SER per memory bit grows smoothly by technology
size reduction [24], SER per system increases sharply. As mentioned before,
14T structure has more noise margin and critical charge which is translated
to more resistance against any instability including high energy particles or
bit flipping during read operation [91].
In this section, the system-level experiments are presented for a typical
32 x 32 bit register file, where power oriented experiments were conducted
to verify the effectiveness of the proposed architecture. As shown in Figure
4.8, in order to get accurate simulation results, a WATTCH power simulator
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TABLEAU 4.1: The number of instructions for the used benchmarks
CC1 120063021
Rijndael 37605118
Anagram 11074903422
Dijkstra 54882999
Sha 13541298
[27] was modified by estimating the cycle-accurate power consumption using
HSPICE results. Hence, cycle-level simulations based on a 5-stage pipeline
out-of-order processor modeled by a SimpleScalar simulation environment
[22] were performed. We extensively modified the simulator code to support
the proposed reliability enhancement technique.
For this evaluation, benchmarks from two different sets of applications,
namely the SPEC CPU2000 benchmark suite [8] and MiBench [55], were
compiled for the Alpha instruction set architecture. The number of instruc-
tions committed during the simulation of the different used benchmarks are
shown in Table 4.1.
To evaluate the amount of error resilience of ARH RF, we developed a
fault injection platform where the injected error locality is defined depending
on the actual cell’s error rate. The fault injection triggering occurs based on
a pseudo-random process that is activated based on the probability of error
in the targeted memory. The Flowchart 4.7 represents the implemented fault
injection mechanism.
Considering again the benchmark distribution depicted in Figure 4.1, and
aforementioned SER of protected and unprotected bits, normalized error
rates are shown in Figure 4.9.
The increase in static power because of joiner switches is small. When
those switches are ON, it is expected that same value of data is stored on both
cells and they keep unchanged voltage on both sides. During write operation,
writing just effective length will save power and compensate the extra power
for writing redundant data. Based on the cycle-accurate behavior simulator,
the power oriented modifications track the accessed registers at run-time and
compute the power values, cycle-by-cycle, based on the hardware configura-
CHAPTER 4. RF RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT THROUGHADJACENT NARROW-WIDTH EXPLOITATION79
Program 
Execu-on 
Inject 
Error
? 
Fault Injec-on 
Carry on RF 
Access 
NO Probability of Error 
Register File 
Access 
Applica-on.c 
YES 
Figure 4.7: Fault injection flowchart.
Cycle‐Accurate 
Simulator 
HSPICE  
   Cycle‐By‐Cycle Hw Access 
           Count 
 Hw Conﬁg 
Power Es6mates 
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CHAPTER 4. RF RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT THROUGHADJACENT NARROW-WIDTH EXPLOITATION80
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
CC1  Rijndael  Anagram  Dijkstra  Sha 
ARH RF  ConvenDonal RF 
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tion and the HSPICE simulation results. The normalized power consumption
results presented in Figure 4.10 show that the overall power overhead doesn’t
exceed 12% in the worst case.
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RF.
Operand detection circuit is very simple and has no effect on clock time.
Similarly, additional read multiplexers are simple and may have small neg-
ative effect. For simplicity, they can be moved from output of RF stage to
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execution stage like [59] in case of increase in clock time. For each pair of
bits, two switches are added in between them. Depending on type of switches
and number of read and write ports of RF, area overhead is indicated to be
around 10%-20% [45].
4.5 Conclusion and future work
In this work we proposed a novel narrow-width register duplication technique.
Similar to other studies of this kind, leading bits (0 or 1) are detected and
used for reliability enhancement. However by a different approach, we ex-
ploited those redundant bits for hardening bit cells in circuit level, benefiting
from configurable 7T/14T SRAM cell structure [46]. Besides, the proposed
technique exploits adjacent registers non significant bits for reliability en-
hancement. This aspect not only affords protection to long-length values but
is also very efficient in critical data hardening within an application. We
showed that by benefiting from considerable bit error rate improvement of
7T/14T and a clever byte pairing, average numerical error of integers stored
in RF is reduced significantly in comparison to baseline RF. In future works,
we also exploit early data criticality detection technique to achieve a more
precise reliability enhancement targeting only critical registers.
Chapter 5
SRAM Memories Reliability
Enhancement
This chapter describes AS8-SRAM, a modified SRAM cell to enhance
memories hardening against transient errors.
5.1 Introduction
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) result from a voltage transient event induced
by alpha particles from packaging material or neutron particles from cosmic
rays [97]. This event is created due to the collection of charge at a p-n
junction after a track of electron-hole pairs is generated. A sufficient amount
of accumulated charge in the struck node may invert the state of a logic
device, such as a latch, static random access memory (SRAM) cell, or logic
gate, thereby introducing an error into the hit circuit. In past technologies,
this issue was considered in a limited range of applications in which the
circuits are operating under aggressive environmental conditions like aero-
space applications. Nevertheless, shrinking the transistor size and reducing
the supply voltage in new technologies result in a remarkable decrease of the
capacitance per transistor leading to a higher vulnerability within circuits
nodes.
SEUs become a challenging limitation of reliability in CMOS circuits, es-
pecially for memories. Moreover, the Semiconductor Industry Association
(SIA) roadmaps indicate that embedded memories are exceeding 90% of the
chip area in the next few years [7]. Consequently, the overall systems reli-
ability is considerably affected by the memory immunity to errors. Despite
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Figure 5.1: Standard 6T-SRAM cell circuit
of the numerous published works, SRAM reliability enhancement is still an
open problematic especially for new technologies.
The present work suggests a circuit-level technique to enhance the soft
error resilience of SRAM memories. We present AS8-SRAM, a new memory
cell that enhances SRAM soft error immunity by increasing the cell criti-
cal charge. SPICE simulations show that AS8-SRAM almost doubles the
6T SRAM cell critical charge with acceptable access power overhead and
negligible performance cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II provides a back-
ground on the SRAM architecture and the soft error mechanism followed
by an overview of related works dealing with soft error mitigation in SRAM
memories. The suggested architecture (AS8-SRAM) is detailed in section III.
Next, in section IV we explain the experimental methodology used in this
work and show the results. Finally, we conclude in section V.
The present work here has been realized in cooperation with Pr Fadi Kur-
dahi Pr Ahmed Eltawil and M. Wael Elsharkasy from the Universty of Cali-
fornia, Irvine (USA) during an exchange internship in UCI.
CHAPTER 5. SRAM MEMORIES RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT 84
5.2 AS8-SRAM: Asymmetric SRAM Archi-
tecture For Soft Error Hardening En-
hancement
5.2.1 Background and Related Work
Six-transistor SRAM cells (6T-SRAMs) are memory cells built using a stor-
age element and two access transistors. Fig 1 shows a standard 6-T SRAM:
the stored data is determined by the state of nodes S1 and S2. The storage
nodes are formed by a pair of cross-coupled inverters and are accessed through
two NMOS transistors (see Fig 1). Consequently, if a particle-induced cur-
rent appears in one of the cell’s sensitive nodes (S1 or S2), it may propagate
through the struck inverter and cause a transient noise on the second sensi-
tive node. This will cause the second node to propagate the corrupted value,
thereby flipping both nodes and by consequence, flipping the state of the bit
stored in the SRAM cell. The minimum charge required to flip the cell is
called the critical charge (Qc) [20]. Hence, a soft error occurs when the charge
resulting from the electron-hole pairs induced by an ionizing particle, and col-
lected at a junction, is greater than the hit node’s critical charge. Numerous
works have focused on soft error mitigation to limit SER in SRAMs:
Architecture level error resilience techniques like ECCs (Error Correcting
Codes) have been proposed and widely used [78]. The simplest form is the
parity check method whose major weakness is its incapability to correct the
detected errors [52]. Another form of ECC used in memories is the SECDED
(single error correction, double errors detection) [48]. The main problem of
the SECDED is its area overhead and the supplementary latency leading to
performance loss. A multi-copy cache (MC2) fault tolerant memory has been
proposed in [31]. The idea behind MC2 is to exploit the cache area by multi
redundant lines in order to detect the possible faults and correct them by a
majority vote. A fault tolerant architecture presented in [18] combines both
parity and single redundancy to enhance memories reliability. In [21], 2-D
matrix codes (MC) have been proposed to efficiently correct soft errors per
word with a low delay. A combination of ECCs and a circuit level hardening
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technique is presented in [47]. The weakness of these these techniques is
their area, power and delay overheads due to the additional memory cells
and supporting circuits required for error detection and correction.
Circuit level techniques have been proposed to overcome architecture level
overheads. These techniques enhance soft error resilience in SRAM cells
either by slowing down the response of the circuit to transient events, or
by increasing its Qc. Upsizing the memory cells transistors increases the
effective capacitance of the device and thus Qc is also increased. This Qc
increment can make the cell less likely to be affected by the particle strike
[77]. However, as it is shown in [82], the gain in cell robustness depends on
the exact transistors that are upsized. Other methods such as [50] suggest to
harden the cell using a pass transistor that is controlled by a refreshing signal.
The authors of [72] add a redundant cross-coupled inverter to the 6T-SRAM
to increase the cell critical charge. In [64] the authors proposed a quad-
node 10-T memory cell which uses negative feedback to prevent memory bit
flip. In [70], a 11-T single ended memory cell has been proposed to enhance
soft error tolerance using refreshing mechanisms. Based on hysteresis effect
of Schmitt trigger, [69] proposes a hardened 13-T memory cell. However,
this technique slows down the memory due to Schmitt trigger’s hysteresis
temporal characteristics. A modified hardened memory cell (RHM-12T) is
proposed in [53] using 12 transistors. The next section details the proposed
AS8-SRAM cell.
5.3 AS8-SRAM: Architecture
The more charge the strike-induced pulse injects into the SRAM cell, the
more likely the stored data gets corrupted. In order to harden the SRAM
cell against Single Event Upsets (SEUs), the aim of AS8-SRAM is to create
an internal resistance to the current pulse induced by the injected charge
movements. In fact, the pulse induced in the output of the struck inverter
is forwarded to the input of the second inverter. During this metastable
state, the output of the second inverter strengthens the corrupted data until
settling at a new stable erroneous state. If the critical charge of the SRAM cell
is higher than the injected charge due to a charged particle hit, the induced
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Figure 5.2: AS8-SRAM Architecture
glitch will disappear after the strike and the cell will restore its original state.
Our approach is to present a radiation hardened architecture by attenuating
the corrupting effect due to a particle strike by strengthening the original
feedback cell mechanism.
AS8-SRAM architecture is designed to enhance the SRAM cell resilience
at circuit level with the lowest possible overhead. As shown in Figure 5.2,
AS8-SRAM is different from 8T-SRAM [62] and is designed by adding a
CMOS inverter in parallel with the storage element of the SRAM cell. The
additional inverter’s role is to resist to any metastable state caused by a parti-
cle strike induced pulse. In fact, the additional inverter increases the sensitive
nodes capacitance and facilitates the initial data recovery by pulling the sig-
nal back to the initial correct state. Consequently, the impact of particle
strikes on the AS8-SRAM is subdued and limited by the additional inverter
effect. As a matter of fact, the minimum amount of collected charge needed
to flip the stored data is increased by AS8-SRAM which enhances the immu-
nity of the SRAM cell against soft errors. AS8-SRAM reliability enhancement
level depends on the direction of the additional inverter vis-a-vis the struck
node. Hence, we denote direction1 the case where the particle strike occurs
in the node S1 that is driven by the additional inverter. Direction2 corre-
sponds to a particle strike in the node S2. Despite the asymmetric aspect of
the proposed cell, the reliability of the SRAM is enhanced in both directions.
In FPGA configuration SRAM cells, the suitable orientation choice is
shown in Figure 5.2. This choice is based on the assumption that zeros are
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more likely to be contained in memory cells then ones in configuration bits.
In fact, it was noticed across different designs observed in [81] and [49] that
up to 87% of the stored data within embedded memories are zeros.
As detailed in the next section, given that the signal states of the sensitive
nodes are strengthened by AS8-SRAM, the read operation becomes faster.
However, increasing the nodes capacitance results in a write time penalty
that doesn’t exceed 1
500
of the period for 1GHz frequency. Moreover, to
minimize the power consumption overhead due to the extra circuitry, the
additional inverter’s transistors are set to the minimum possible dimensions.
In fact, both the N and P transistors have a width equal to the length:
L=W=65nm. Notice that upsizing the additional inverter increases the Qc
and by consequence enhances the SRAM reliability. However, it results in
performance loss, access time and power overhead increase. Hence, a tradeoff
between the additional overheads and reliability has to be considered.
5.3.1 Experimental methodology
The Qc of a memory cell is the minimum charge collected due to a particle
strike which results in a bit flip. Therefore, the vulnerability of SRAM cells
to soft errors is typically estimated based on its critical charge, Qc [79].
The SER by cell decreases exponentially with the Qc increase as shown in
Equation 5.1 below [58]:
SER = K × φ× A× exp (−
Qc
Qs
) (5.1)
Where K is is a proportionality constant, φ is the neutron flux with energy
greater than 1MeV, A is the sensitive area of the circuit and Qs is the charge
collection efficiency of the device, in fC. We model the soft error in SRAM
cells by a current pulse injected into a sensitive cell node. Hence, we mon-
itor the cell behavior under particle strike by the observation of its SPICE
simulation results. To highlight the reliability enhancement performed by
AS8-SRAM architecture, we use the critical charge as an indicator of the
memory cell resistance to particle strikes. We determine AS8-SRAM’s crit-
ical charge at nominal voltage which corresponds to 1.1V for 65nm PTM
CHAPTER 5. SRAM MEMORIES RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT 88
TABLEAU 5.1: Sizes of the transistors used in the different tested memory
cells.
NMOS width (nm) PMOS width (nm) Length (nm)
Standard 6T-SRAM 260 177 65
Upsized SRAM 291 209 65
AS8-SRAM a 65 65 65
3-eq-SRAM 195 139.5 65
4-eq-SRAM [72] 146.25 104.75 65
aThe dimensions shown for AS8-SRAM correspond to the
additional inverter. The transistor dimensions of the original
cross coupled inverters are the same as 6T-SRAM
[5] and track its under voltage scaling. We compare these results with the
following cells:
• A standard 6T-SRAM cell.
• A 6T-SRAM cell with upsized transistor dimensions.
• A 6T-SRAM cell with only 1 upsized inverter dimensions (referred to
as ”upsized 1inv”).
• 3-eq-SRAM: a hardened SRAM cell composed of three inverters with
equivalent transistor dimensions.
• A soft error hardened SRAM cell proposed in [72] that we refer to as
4-eq-SRAM.
To insure a fair comparison, the three latter architectures are sized so that
the overall cell area is equal to AS8-SRAM.
Table 1 details the sizes of the different transistors used in the architec-
tures mentioned above. As the charge required for 1-0 transition is lower than
the 0-1 transition, we considered the ?1? storage node for current injection.
In our experiments, we determine Qc by injecting current pulses into
the sensitive nodes of the memory cell. These pulses simulate the current
induced by the particle strike. To calculate Qc, we determine the minimum
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Figure 5.3: Graphical definition of critical charge. VS1 and VS2 are node S1
and S2 voltages, referencing Fig 5.2.
magnitude and duration of an injected current pulse that is sufficient to flip
the data in the memory cell. Hence, Qc is determined by integrating the
current pulse corresponding to the smallest charge injected that flips the
memory cell. Fig 3 graphically illustrates the quantification of the cell Qc.
The critical time (Tc) is the time between the beginning of the current pulse
and the intersection between the two cell nodes voltages. As shown in [64],
we assume that once the memory cell reaches this state ”t=Tc”, the feedback
between the cell nodes becomes strong enough to result in an erroneous stable
state by flipping the initially stored data. Therefore, the injected charge until
Tc is sufficient to flip the state of the cell and the critical charge is equal to
the charge injected by the the current pulse up to t=Tc:
Qc =
∫ Tc
0
iinj(t)dt (5.2)
Where iinj(t) is the current pulse injected into the sensitive node to sim-
ulate the SEU.
System level simulations are also performed to show the impact of AS8-
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Figure 5.4: Critical charge and corresponding SER by cell for the different
tested circuits under nominal Vdd
SRAM-based cache memory on energy consumption and reliability within a
microprocessor architecture. We compare AS8-SRAM memory results with
SECDED results from [31] for 65nm technology.
The next section details and discusses the experimental results in terms
of reliability and power/performance overhead.
5.3.2 Results
5.3.3 Reliability under nominal Vdd
To quantify the impact of the proposed architecture on the SRAM cell soft
error resilience, we calculate the Qc based on the simulation results and
compare the AS8-SRAM Qc with the different memory cell architectures
mentioned in the previous section. Figure 5.4 represents theQc corresponding
to the different SRAM architectures fed by the nominal voltage for the 65nm
technology.
The results in Figure 5.4 show that AS8-SRAM has the highest Qc for
both direction1 and direction2 of the additional inverter. In fact, in this
case AS8-SRAM increases the critical charge of the standard 6T-SRAM cell
by more than 95% in direction1 and 83% in in direction2. In terms of SER,
Equation 5.1 implies that the critical charge augmentation corresponds to 58
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Figure 5.5: Critical charge versus supply voltage scaling
times less Failure In Time (FIT) compared to 6T-SRAM in direction1 and
more than 16 times less in direction2. We note that SER is calculated based
on Equation 5.1. As we calculate the normalized SER, the proportionality
constant K disappears from the equation. The remaining parameters used to
apply the SER model in our case are directly got from [63]. The area ratios
are calculated through the different designs cell areas.
5.3.4 Reliability under voltage scaling
Dynamic voltage scaling techniques are commonly used to reduce the power
dissipation in memory architectures [44]. Nevertheless, in addition to the
time penalty, reducing the supply voltage results in a higher cell sensitivity
and by consequence increases the memories SER.
We performed SPICE analysis to calculate Qc of the different architec-
tures operating under scaled supply voltages. Figure 5.5 shows the critical
charge of the 6T-SRAM, AS8-SRAM and the upsized SRAM in terms of
the supply voltage. The results show that when Vdd=1V (scaled down by
CHAPTER 5. SRAM MEMORIES RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT 92
3.7 
3.15 
3.93 
3.26 3.18 
2.3 
Qcrit=5.25  Qcrit=4 
Access Power (10‐7 W) 
Regular SRAM  upsized SRAM  AS8‐SRAM 
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9%), AS8-SRAM critical charge is almost equal to the standard SRAM’s Qc
when operating under its nominal voltage. Besides, the results presented in
Figure 5.6 show that for the same reliability level AS8-SRAM is much more
power efficient than the regular SRAM or the upsized SRAM. In fact AS8-
SRAM consumes 30% less power than the upsized SRAM and 27% less than
the regular SRAM for Qc = 4fC. On the other hand, Figures ?? and ??
show the performance comparison between AS8-SRAM, 6T-SRAM and the
upsized SRAM for a fixed Qc values of 4 fC and 5.25 fC respectively. The
results show that AS8-SRAM has an average read time overhead of 6.35 ps
and 4.075 ps for respectively Qc= 4 fC and Qc= 5.25 fC compared with the
regular SRAM. For a frequency of 1 GHz, this overhead represents less than
0.7% of the period time.
In order to study the reliability of a AS8-SRAM-based memory, we com-
pare the probability of failure (POF) of a 16kB 4-way associative cache mem-
ory implemented with different technologies: conventional cache (CC) based
on 6T-SRAM cells, a cache protected by SECDED [31] and a AS8-SRAM-
based memory.
Let be:
• N : the number of SRAM cells in a cache memory.
• p(V ) : probability of failure of each 6T-SRAM cell at voltage V.
• pAS8(V ) : mean probability of failure (between direction1 and
direction2 of each AS8-SRAM cell at voltage V.
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Figure 5.7: Probability of failure (POF) vs Vdd for a 16kB cache using:
SECDED cache, CC and AS8-SRAM-based cache under iso-area constraint
Hence, the POF of a conventional cache is expressed by Equation 5.3:
Pcc = 1− (1− p(V ))
N (5.3)
The POF of a AS8-SRAM-based memory PAS8−mem(V ) can be expressed
by Equation 5.4:
PAS8−mem(V ) = 1− (1− PAS8(V ))
N (5.4)
Figure 5.7 shows the POF comparison between the different technologies
implementing a 16kB 4-way associative cache memory. In order to perform
a fair comparison, the cache memories results correspond to equal area for
the three technologies. SECDED results are based on SPICE simulation
with PTM [5] models taken from [31] for 65nm. Figure 5.7 shows that the
implementation of a cache memory using AS8-SRAM cells carries out bet-
ter reliability enhancement than SECDED for equal area. Moreover, un-
like SECDED that needs additional circuitry to detect and correct errors,
AS8-SRAM-based memory performs significant error probability reduction
without changing the memory architecture.
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5.3.5 System level energy consumption
In this section, experiments are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the
proposed architecture at a higher abstraction level. To quantify the system
level energy consumption, we modified Simplescalar 3.0 [22] extensively to
support the tested architectures. Thereafter, WATTCH [27], a Simplescalar-
based power simulator was modified by estimating the cycle-accurate power
consumption using HSPICE results in order to get accurate power estima-
tions. The power oriented modifications track the accessed cells at run-time
and compute the power values, cycle-by-cycle, based on the hardware config-
uration and the SPICE simulation results. In order to carry out a fair com-
parison, we constrain that the tested caches have equal failure rate. Since the
conventional 6T-SRAM cache (CC) is the least reliable, it is run at nominal
supply voltage while voltage reduction is applied to the other architectures,
such that probabilities of failure of all three caches are same at the respective
Vdd. For this evaluation, we used benchmarks from two sets of embedded
applications, namely the SPEC CPU2000 benchmark suite [8] and MiBench
[55]. All benchmarks are compiled with Compaq alpha compiler using -O4
flag for Alpha 21264 ISA and the results correspond to a 16kB 4-way asso-
ciative data cache memory running at a frequency of 1GHz.
Figure 5.8(a) shows that for a considered POF, a AS8-SRAM-based cache
memory consumes an average of 22% less energy than a conventional cache
and 16% less than SECDED while insuring the same reliability level for iso-
area. However, as SECDED needs additional circuitry, it negatively impacts
the delay and decreases the whole processor performance. In fact, as shown
in Figure 5.8(b), AS8-SRAM has higher EDP reduction than SECDED with
no loss in terms of instructions per cycle (IPC).
5.4 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed AS8-SRAM, a new 8-Transistors asymmetric cell
to protect SRAM memories from soft errors. At circuit level, the proposed
architecture increases memory cells critical charge and reinforces the storage
element resistance to bit flips. At system level, our experiments on embed-
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Figure 5.8: Energy and performance results for a set of embedded
benchmarks
ded benchmarks show that AS8-SRAM has the advantage of maintaining
a reasonable reliability level at decreased supply voltage. We demonstrated
that AS8-SRAM-based cache memory shows lower probability of failure com-
pared to SECDED. Moreover, energy-oriented results demonstrate that the
proposed architecture reduces total energy consumption by up to 22% over
conventional caches without any considerable loss in terms of IPC. Future
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work will explore the possibility of combining AS8-SRAM with other tech-
niques for higher reliability enhancement.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the thesis by presenting the research contributions
and proposing some future works and extension horizons to this research.
To cope with the increasing complexity of new applications trends, emerg-
ing embedded systems are subject to several contradictory constraints. In
fact, on the one hand systems need extremely high performance with low
power consumption. On the other hand, the circuits need to be shrunk
without loosing reliability. The performance requirements coupled with re-
sources constraint lead to an inevitable solution that consists of circuits re-
programmability to take advantage from resource reuse. However, FPGAs’
fine-grained reconfiguration is limited by the programming latency that con-
sists a considerable problem especially for real-time applications. In this
research, we proposed a high speed reconfiguration method that takes ad-
vantage from DSP slices intrinsic flexibility and offers an effective time mul-
tiplexing of different hardware units. In addition, the continuous shrinking
transistor dimensions lead to increasing vulnerability of electronic devices:
sequential as well as combinational parts. This thesis suggests reliability
enhancement techniques of memories and computing elements in different
levels, namely in circuit level, architecture level as well as system level.
The main contributions and possible future work from this work are pre-
sented in the following sections.
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6.1 Contributions
6.1.1 A High Speed Reconfiguration Technique for
DSP-based Circuits
This research proposed a high speed Dynamic Reconfiguration (DR) tech-
nique for DSP-based circuits. We present an attempt to overcome the limi-
tations of the conventional FPGAs DR process using a resources-aware ap-
proach. The main idea resides in taking advantage from DSP slices flexibility
to build circuits with the ability to carry out the multiplexing of heavy hard-
ware blocks rapidly. The reconfiguration process requires only one clock
cycle, and this, regardless the circuit size and complexity. Moreover, a tool is
proposed to accelerate the design process by generating configuration vectors
corresponding to the desired functionality.
6.1.2 An Auto-tuning Fault Tolerance Architecture for
Obstacle Detection in Railway Transportation
In this thesis, a cross-layer modeling of input-dependent masking mechanisms
within computing elements is proposed. The proposed model combines tran-
sistor level error masking in combinational circuits with system level masking
intrinsic to a wide range of applications. Hence, circuits intrinsic masking
phenomena impact on SERs can be estimated at design-time depending on
the applied input combination. Based on our vulnerability estimation model,
we build a new fault tolerant architecture that adapts the reliability policy to
the actual requirements of the system. The aim is to build error mitigation
techniques that protect circuits while using minimum redundant resources.
The proposed architecture is auto-tuning and the reliability-dedicated re-
sources are utilized to target only vulnerable parts of the system. In fact,
using the dynamic reconfiguration technique referred to in the first contribu-
tion, the system chooses at run-time the redundancy map depending on the
vulnerability estimation. As the reliability requirements vary depending on
the application field as well as the system operating environment, the pro-
posed technique allows designers to tune the reliability enhancement strat-
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egy depending on the actual application, field and operating environment
requirements. Hence, it offers more accurately relaxed reliability thereby
saving resources as well as power.
6.1.3 Memories Reliability Enhancement
In addition to computing elements, this research also focus on sequential ele-
ments and memories reliability. A circuit level modified SRAM architecture
that hardens the memories against soft errors: with a single inverter put
in parallel with the 6T-SRAM memory cell, AS8-SRAM increases the crit-
ical charge of the cell thereby reducing the probability of soft errors. The
advantage of AS8-SRAM is its low overhead with comparable hardening re-
sults to state of the art techniques.Moreover, an architecture level method
for register files reliability enhancement in microprocessors is proposed. We
use adjacent registers narrow-width to enhance registers immunity to errors.
Using this opportunistic fault tolerance technique, the overall processor reli-
ability is enhanced with low additional circuitry and without any additional
memory.
6.2 Future Work
The soft error rate in SRAMs continues to increase with technology scaling,
and new phenomena like Multiple Bit Upsets (MBU) has emerged as a seri-
ous threat to systems reliability. Hence, the research on error mitigation in
new submicron circuits will be continuously crucial. Moreover, as far as the
reconfiguration latency of FPGAs is still a bottleneck, proposing high-speed
reconfiguration techniques will remain a hot research topic. Some future
works and extensions of this thesis are presented in the following.
Development and application of ARENA: The reconfiguration
method proposed in Chapter 2 has a huge impact on reconfiguration latency.
However, ARENA is still complicated to use and needs more development
to be easily accessible by designers. We are currently working on extending
the approach to higher abstraction levels. In fact, instead of having a circuit
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description as input, the proposed extension is to generate the circuit speci-
fications based on C codes describing the functions to implement. Moreover,
a possible extension is to automatically generate the HDL code correspond-
ing to the DSP-based reconfigurable circuit. These two extensions can lead
to a High-Level-Synthesis-like (HLS) tool that takes C kernels as input and
implements them in a resource-sharing hardware block. Hence, not only re-
configuration latency bottleneck is overcome, but also the time to market
would be remarkably reduced.
From application view, we are exploring the possibility to build a recon-
figurable system dedicated to object recognition with heterogeneous sensors
in railroad crossing safety systems. The idea is to apply ARENA to reuse
the same hardware resources for both image and radar signals processing for
recognition purpose. A DSP-based hardware block can be configured to carry
out a first radar-based classification that is enhanced later by the results of
image-based classification thereby enhancing the recognition efficiency with
optimized resources.
Further reliability enhancement: To judiciously enhance RFs error
mitigation, a possible extension of the ARH RF can be based on a compiler-
level data criticality estimation. The idea is to identify the critical data at
early stage and target them by reliability enhancement so that the resources
are utilized more efficiently. Furthermore, using non-adjacent cells for hard-
ening purpose can be a suitable solution to avoid the MBU phenomenon.
Another interesting close idea is the use of mantissa bits in floating point
numbers to enhance the reliability of the exponent part within floating point
RFs. In fact, depending on the application field, sacrificing some precision
in the sake of reliability would be a good choice.
The proposed reliability enhancement technique for threshold-based ap-
plications (ARDAS) can be generalized to approximate computing applica-
tions. In fact, a new approach of reliability-precision trade-off can be explored
to design highly reliable systems with optimized overheads based on accept-
able precision sacrificing. Moreover, a new problematic that needs to be dealt
with is the reliability-aware task partitioning within a heterogeneous system
especially if it contains a DSP-based reconfigurable block. In fact, the
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